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A bedrock feature of sovereignty is a court exercising jurisdiction.
1
 For 
Native nations, this is at risk. Through its judicial institution, a sovereign 
nation supports the force and effect of its laws, promotes respect for 
authority, and maintains culture.
2
 A rule in federal law, which this Article 
calls the “tribal remedies doctrine,” provides vital support to tribal 
judiciaries: it requires litigants to exhaust tribal court remedies before 
pursuing claims in a nontribal court. While the doctrine is mandatory in 
federal court, state courts across the country have shown different 
perspectives on whether it applies to them. With growing disorder among 
state courts, tribal court authority varies throughout the country. 
Considering the importance of courts in Native nations, this result is not 
acceptable. Establishing a uniform approach is critical to supporting tribal 
sovereignty and preventing arbitrary geography from determining each 
tribe’s authority. U.S. Supreme Court precedent, with special attention to 
Iowa Mutual, requires state courts to apply the tribal remedies doctrine. 
Separating the doctrine from the legal rules of administrative exhaustion 
and abstention confirms this conclusion and reveals that a pending tribal 
court action is not required before applying the tribal remedies doctrine in 
state courts. 
I. Introduction 
In 1985, the United States Supreme Court decided National Farmers and 
first announced the rule that litigants must exhaust tribal remedies before 
                                                                                                             
` * Pete Heidepriem is an attorney in South Dakota, where he litigates a variety of civil 
cases and serves as a tribal prosecutor for the Lower Brule Sioux Tribe. For thoughtful edits 
and interest in this article, thanks to the American Indian Law Review. Thanks as well to the 
people who took the time to read this in its very early forms: Judge Jeffrey Viken, Judge 
Patricia Sullivan, Eric Schlimgen, Alexander Ball, and the sharpest reader the author knows, 
Kelly Wong. 
 1. See Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 14–18 (1987). 
 2. Robert D. Cooter & Wolfgang Fikentscher, Indian Common Law: The Role of 
Custom in American Indian Tribal Courts (Part I of II), 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 287, 293 (1998); 
Frank Pommersheim & Sherman Marshall, Liberation, Dreams, and Hard Work: An Essay 
on Tribal Court Jurisprudence, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 411, 429–34.  
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pressing their cases in a nontribal court.
3
 Most courts now refer to the rule 
as the tribal court exhaustion doctrine. Since National Farmers, the 
Supreme Court has provided further comment on the rule only a few times.
4
 
As lower courts applied the doctrine, its general outline and underlying 
rationales became settled law, but the finer contours proved to be less 
straightforward. Two questions emerged as particularly divisive. First, does 
the doctrine, originally directed at federal courts, apply to state courts? And 
second, is a pending tribal court suit a prerequisite to invoking the doctrine?  
Courts and scholars come to many different conclusions on these 
questions. To varying degrees, courts in eighteen states have substantively 
addressed the doctrine’s applicability.
5
 The Utah Supreme Court’s 2017 
decision in Harvey v. Ute Tribe is the latest comprehensive analysis of this 
question in a state court.
6
 Many more state and federal court decisions sort 
through the necessity of a pending case in tribal court. Since 2009, the 
Supreme Court declined to hear two cases presenting the issue of the 
doctrine’s state court application.
7
 The most recent instance was Harvey, 
and before the Supreme Court denied that petition for writ of certiorari in 
January 2019, it issued an order inviting a brief from the Office of the 
United States Solicitor General setting out the views of the United States.
8
 
The Solicitor General filed a brief in December 2018, recommending denial 
of the petition and providing thorough and previously unknown positions 
on these two key issues of the doctrine; specifically, that the doctrine might 
apply to state courts, and that it likely requires an already-filed tribal case.
9
  
Names are important, so a point about them must be made at the outset. 
Sometimes courts establish and label a legal doctrine, and as the doctrine 
develops, a gap grows between the name and the substantive principles. For 
                                                                                                             
 3. Nat’l Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 855–57 
(1985). 
 4. See, e.g., Iowa Mut., 480 U.S. at 14–19; Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 
448–53 (1997); see also Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 369 (2001); El Paso Nat. Gas Co. v. 
Neztsosie, 526 U.S. 473, 483–85 (1999). 
 5. See infra Part III; see infra Appendix I. 
 6. Harvey v. Ute Indian Tribe of Uintah & Ouray Reservation, 2017 UT 75, 416 P.3d 
401, cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 784 (2019). 
 7. Harvey, 139 S. Ct. 784; Coushatta Tribe of La. v. Meyer & Assocs., Inc., 556 U.S. 
1166 (2009). 
 8. U.S. Supreme Court, Order List: 585 U.S. (June 25, 2018), https://www.supreme 
court.gov/orders/courtorders/062518zor_g3bh.pdf.  
 9. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Harvey v. UTE Indian Tribe of the 
Uintah & Ouray Reservation, 416 P.3d 401 (2019) (No. 17-1301), 2018 WL 6382963, at 
*12, *18; see infra Section III.D.5(a)(2). 
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instance, the doctrine of fraudulent joinder is widely described as a 
misnomer.
10
 It relates to pleading strategies to avoid federal jurisdiction, not 
actual fraud.
11
 Similarly, using the title “exhaustion of tribal remedies” 
breeds confusion because it brings to mind the well-established doctrine of 
exhaustion of administrative remedies.
12
 This disconnect has prompted 
scholars and judges to frequently discuss them together.
13
 Later, this Article 
conducts a side-by-side analysis of the two doctrines and explains some 
core distinctions.
14
 From this point on, the Article will use the terms “tribal 
remedies doctrine,” “tribal exhaustion,” or simply, “the doctrine” to address 
this issue. The reasoning that follows seeks to provide a basis for this name 
adjustment and highlight a path forward for preserving doctrinal integrity.
15
  
In Part II, this Article sets forth the tribal remedies doctrine, with a brief 
history of its roots and discussion of the leading Supreme Court cases. Part 
III lays out the assortment of state court decisions engaging with the 
doctrine, giving special emphasis to the Harvey case. Next, Part IV 
contrasts the doctrine with the legal rules of administrative exhaustion and 
abstention to show that the doctrine lacks a fitting analog. Parts V and VI 
respectively establish the positions that the tribal remedies doctrine applies 
to state courts and that a pending tribal court case need not be a 
prerequisite.  
  
                                                                                                             
 10. Schur v. L.A. Weight Loss Ctrs., Inc., 577 F.3d 752, 763 n.9 (7th Cir. 2009) (“As 
many courts have noted, the term ‘fraudulent joinder’ is a bit of a misnomer—the doctrine 
requires neither fraud nor joinder.”) (citations omitted).  
 11. James F. Archibald III, Note, Reintroducing “Fraud” to the Doctrine of Fraudulent 
Joinder, 78 VA. L. REV. 1377, 1387 (1992); see also Matthew J. Richardson, Clarifying and 
Limiting Fraudulent Joinder, 58 FLA. L. REV. 119, 130 n.62 (2006). 
 12. See infra Part IV for a discussion of the administrative exhaustion doctrine. 
 13. See id. 
 14. The Article also compares two abstention doctrines: Colorado River and Younger. 
See id. As discussed infra, separating out these different legal rules elucidates the roots of 
the tribal remedies doctrine and whether it has a role in state courts. Changing the name to 
the tribal remedies doctrine is essential to achieving greater analytical clarity.  
 15. Speaking of names, this Article uses the legal terms of art “Indian” and “Indian 
Country” where necessary. “The word ‘Indian’ has become a legal term of art with varying 
definitions depending on the context.” St. Cloud v. United States, 702 F. Supp. 1456, 1460 
(D.S.D. 1988); see also F.T.C. v. Payday Fin., LLC, 935 F. Supp. 2d 926, 929 n.1 (D.S.D. 
2013). See generally 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2018) (defining “Indian country”); COHEN’S 
HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 3.03, at 170–83 (Nell Jessup Newton et al. eds., 
2012) [hereinafter COHEN] (defining “Indian”); id. § 3.04, at 183–202 (defining “Indian 
country”); Ryan Fortson, Advancing Tribal Court Criminal Jurisdiction in Alaska, 32 
ALASKA L. REV. 93, 108–09 (2015) (describing categories of land within Indian Country). 
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II. The Tribal Remedies Doctrine 
A. Brief Background on Tribal Courts 
Beyond dispute: Native nations are sovereigns whose existence and 
powers preceded the creation of the United States government.
16
 Since the 
founding of the United States, there has been an ongoing process of 
determining the relationship and balance of power between tribes and the 
federal government.
17
 Two principles underlie the development of that 
balance: first, the federal government’s trust responsibility to tribes, and 
second, the federal policy of supporting tribal self-government.
18
 Three 
Supreme Court decisions authored by Chief Justice John Marshall set the 
groundwork for the trust responsibility—Johnson v. M’Intosh; Cherokee 
Nation v. Georgia; and Worcester v. Georgia.
19
 A key aspect of Cherokee 
Nation was the decision to “denominate[]” Native nations as “domestic 
dependent nations,”
20
 which continues to be at the front of federal Indian 
law today.
21
 Central to this “dependent” status is Congress’ plenary control 
over tribal authority.
22
 For example, federal courts have recognized the 
tribes’ inherent immunity from suit—a fundamental feature of 
sovereignty—for over one century, and the default position is that tribes are 
immune from suit unless Congress unequivocally expresses its intent to 
abrogate that power.
23
 The trust responsibility “encourages federal 
facilitation of the development of tribal institutions and infrastructure,” in 
part by “providing impetus for legislation furthering, among other issues, 
Indian education, health care, and self-governance.”
24
 
                                                                                                             
 16. Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 572 U.S. 782, 788 (2014). 
 17. See Samuel E. Ennis & Caroline P. Mayhew, Federal Indian Law and Tribal 
Criminal Justice in the Self-Determination Era, 38 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 421, 425–32 (2013-
2014). 
 18. See id. at 425–26.  
 19. Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 
30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). For a more in-
depth description of the cases, see Fortson, supra note 15, at 105–08; id. at 114 (“From the 
Marshall Trilogy we get the underlying principles of much of subsequent American Indian 
law: American Indians have limited title to their land in the form of ‘aboriginal title’; the 
federal government has a trust relationship obligation toward American Indians; and federal 
Indian law is supreme over that of states.”).  
 20. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 17. 
 21. Bay Mills, 572 U.S. at 788. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978) (citing Turner v. United 
States, 248 U.S. 354, 358 (1919)); Bay Mills, 572 U.S. at 788.  
 24. Ennis & Mayhew, supra note 17, at 425–26. 
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The United States’ current support for tribal self-government was a 
“direct response to the so-called Termination Era of the 1940s and 
1950s[.]”
25
 During that era, “Congress moved to withdraw responsibility for 
a number of Indian tribes, along with it recognition of their special legal 
status; attempted to extend state jurisdiction over many more tribes; and 
ultimately sought to assimilate all Indians into the broader polity.”
26
 
Congress expressed the country’s self-governance policy in the Indian Self-
Determination and Education Assistance Act, which promotes tribal control 
over local law enforcement, the Bureau of Indian Affairs, and the Indian 
Health Service.
27
 The Supreme Court’s creation of the tribal remedies 
doctrine accords with this overarching policy.
28
 Congress now prioritizes 
“enhancing tribal court systems and improving access to those systems [to] 




While these general principles still guide today’s interpretations of 
federal Indian law, tribal courts existed before the country’s founding.
30
 
The Supreme Court opinions Chief Justice Marshall penned in the early 
1800s acknowledged tribal judicial systems.
31
 Like their state and federal 
counterparts, tribal courts play a vital role in tribal government—the 
resolution of disputes and the interpretation of laws.
32
 Congress and the 
federal courts, however, have placed certain limitations on the jurisdiction 
of tribal courts.
33
 With respect to civil jurisdiction, cases arising in Indian 
Country between Indian people or against an Indian defendant will 
generally be subject to the tribal court’s exclusive jurisdiction.
34
 The 
                                                                                                             
 25. Id. at 426 (quoting Bethany R. Berger, Williams v. Lee and the Debate over Indian 
Equality, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1463, 1466 (2011)). 
 26. Id.  
 27. 25 U.S.C. §§ 5301–5423 (2018); see Ennis & Mayhew, supra note 17, at 426–27. 
 28. Iowa Mutual Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 14–18 (1987). 
 29. 25 U.S.C. § 3651(7) (2018). 
 30. Cooter & Fikentscher, supra note 2, at 298–302. 
 31. Id. at 299–300; Blake A. Watson, The Curious Case of Disappearing Federal 
Jurisdiction over Federal Enforcement of Federal Law: A Vehicle for Reassessment of the 
Tribal Exhaustion/Abstention Doctrine, 80 MARQ. L. REV. 531, 547–49 (1997). 
 32. Cooter & Fikentscher, supra note 2, at 299–302; Tribal Courts, TRIBAL CT. 
CLEARINGHOUSE, https://www.tribal-institute.org/lists/justice.htm (last visited Aug. 2, 2019).  
 33. Because the subtleties of tribal court jurisdiction are not the centerpiece of this 
Article, it does not delve into the many permutations of facts that raise questions about 
whether tribal courts can exercise authority. This brief overview covers what is necessary for 
an engaged discussion of the tribal remedies doctrine. 
 34. Sanders v. Robinson, 864 F.2d 630, 632 (9th Cir. 1988); see 42 C.J.S. Indians § 62 
(2010). 
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Supreme Court’s decision in Montana v. United States “is the pathmarking 
case concerning tribal civil authority over nonmembers.”
35
 In Montana, the 
Court delineated  
a general rule that, absent a different congressional direction, 
Indian tribes lack civil authority over the conduct of 
nonmembers on non-Indian land within a reservation, subject to 
two exceptions: The first exception relates to nonmembers who 
enter consensual relationships with the tribe or its members; the 
second concerns activity that directly affects the tribe’s political 
integrity, economic security, health, or welfare.
36
 
As to criminal jurisdiction, the inherent power of a tribe provides its 
courts with jurisdiction over Indian people in Indian Country.
37
 With the 
exception of the jurisdiction granted through the Violence Against Women 
Act, non-Indian people in Indian Country are not subject to tribal court 
criminal jurisdiction.
38
 Federal courts have jurisdiction over much of the 
crimes committed in Indian Country. The General Crimes Act applies 
federal jurisdiction to Indian Country as it pertains to federal enclaves like 
federal courthouses and military bases.
39
 And the Major Crimes Act 
establishes federal jurisdiction over certain felonies committed in Indian 
Country.
40
 Whether a state court may exercise criminal jurisdiction over 
crimes in Indian Country depends on the particular state. Congress passed 
Public Law 280 in 1953, which “required certain state governments to 
assume what would otherwise be federal criminal jurisdiction over Indian 
                                                                                                             
 35. Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 445 (1997); see Montana v. United States, 
450 U.S. 544 (1981). 
 36. Strate, 520 U.S. at 446. 
 37. See Ennis & Mayhew, supra note 17, at 432. The tribal remedies doctrine does not 
concern itself with criminal jurisdiction, so the overview provided here is for the purpose of 
giving full context to the function of tribal courts and their relationship with state and federal 
courts. 
 38. Ennis & Mayhew, supra note 17, at 422; see Violence Against Women 
Reauthorization Act of 2013 tit. IX, § 904, 25 U.S.C. § 1304 (2018). 
 39. Ennis & Mayhew, supra note 17, at 429. 
 40. Id. at 429 n.49 (“These fourteen crimes are murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, 
maiming, a felony under chapter 109A [crimes of sexual abuse], incest, assault with intent to 
commit murder, assault with a dangerous weapon, assault resulting in serious bodily injury, 
an assault against an individual who has not attained the age of sixteen years, felony child 
abuse or neglect, arson, burglary, and robbery.”) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2018)). 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol44/iss2/3





 Other specified states could elect to assume the same authority, 




This brief background shows that the balance between tribal, state, and 
federal courts is complicated and in constant development. The Supreme 
Court’s decision in Williams v. Lee proved to be an essential moment in 
history that teed up the creation of the tribal remedies doctrine.
43
 In 1959, 
the Court issued Williams v. Lee, a case where the Arizona state courts 
exercised jurisdiction over a dispute for goods sold from a non-Indian 
person to a Navajo tribal member on the Navajo Nation.
44
 The state court 
refused to dismiss the case on jurisdictional grounds, and the tribal member 
appealed to the Supreme Court arguing that the suit should be in tribal 
court.
45
 The Supreme Court unanimously reversed.
46
 The Court held that 
Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in Worcester v. Georgia and the cases 
flowing from that decision establish the principle that, “absent governing 
Acts of Congress, the question has always been whether the state action 
infringed on the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be 
ruled by them.”
47
 Finding it “immaterial” that the respondent was not a 
tribal member, the Court concluded “[t]here can be no doubt that to allow 
the exercise of state jurisdiction here would undermine the authority of the 
tribal courts over Reservation affairs and hence would infringe on the right 
of the Indians to govern themselves.”
48
 
Following the Supreme Court’s Williams v. Lee decision, the definitive 
moment for the tribal remedies doctrine came with its formal announcement 
in National Farmers. 
  
                                                                                                             
 41. Ennis & Mayhew, supra note 17, at 430. Public Law 280 also grants state courts 
concurrent authority over some civil cases where tribal courts have jurisdiction. See COHEN, 
supra note 15, § 6.04[3][b][i], at 539–40. 
 42. Ennis & Mayhew, supra note 17, at 430–31 (citing Carole Goldberg & Duane 
Champagne, Is Public Law 280 Fit for the Twenty-First Century? Some Data at Last, 38 
CONN. L. REV. 697, 699–701 (2006)). 
 43. 358 U.S. 217 (1959). 
 44. Id. at 217–18. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 223. 
 47. Id. at 218–20. 
 48. Id. at 223. 
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B. National Farmers 
National Farmers was a case grounded in federal question jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
49
 The federal issue was “whether an Indian tribe 
retains the power to compel a non-Indian property owner to submit to the 
civil jurisdiction of a tribal court.”
50
 The case arose from a motorcycle 
striking and injuring Leroy Sage, a member of the Crow Tribe, in the 
parking lot of a school located on land owned by Montana but within the 
exterior boundaries of the Crow Indian Reservation.
51
  
Sage commenced a lawsuit against the school district, an arm of the 
state, in Crow Tribal Court.
52
 After process was served, the defendant did 
not take action and eventually the tribal court entered final judgment in 
Sage’s favor.
53
 To keep the judgment from taking effect, the school and its 
insurer initiated an action in U.S. District Court for the District of Montana, 
seeking a temporary restraining order.
54
 The district court issued a 
temporary restraining order blocking the tribal court’s judgment and its 
exercise of jurisdiction over the case Sage filed.
55
 Later, the district court 
imposed a preliminary injunction against execution of the Crow Tribal 
Court’s judgment and determined that the tribal court lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction.
56
 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed 
because it determined that the district court lacked an adequate basis for 
jurisdiction over the case.
57
 One circuit judge dissented in part and 
concurred in the result, finding that the district court had jurisdiction under 
§ 1331, but that the case should still be dismissed because the insurer and 




                                                                                                             
 49. “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under 
the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2018). This is one 
of the two statutory bases for federal court subject matter jurisdiction; the other is diversity 
jurisdiction. See infra note 73; Iowa Mutual Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 11 (1987) 
(discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1332).  
 50. Nat’l Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 852 (1985). 
 51. Id. at 847. 
 52. Id.  
 53. Id. at 847–48.  
 54. Id. at 848.  
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 848–49. 
 57. Id. at 849. 
 58. Id. 
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The Supreme Court unanimously reversed the Ninth Circuit.
59
 The Court 
held that the “question whether an Indian tribe retains the power to compel 
a non-Indian property owner to submit to the civil jurisdiction of a tribal 
court is one that must be answered by reference to federal law and is a 
‘federal question’ under § 1331.”
60
 In approaching the case’s federal 
question, the Supreme Court determined that the tribal court had a 
legitimate claim to jurisdiction.
61
 The Court explained that “the existence 
and extent of a tribal court’s jurisdiction” is an inquiry that “will require a 
careful examination of tribal sovereignty, the extent to which that 
sovereignty has been altered, divested, or diminished, as well as a detailed 
study of relevant statutes, Executive Branch policy as embodied in treaties 
and elsewhere, and administrative or judicial decisions.”
62
 “[T]hat 
examination[,]” the Court held, “should be conducted in the first instance in 
the Tribal Court itself.”
63
  
The Court provided three reasons for this determination. First, Congress’ 
policy of “supporting tribal self-government and self-determination . . . 
favors a rule that will provide the forum whose jurisdiction is being 
challenged the first opportunity to evaluate the factual and legal bases for 
the challenge.”
64
 Second, “the orderly administration of justice in the 
federal court will be served by allowing a full record to be developed in the 
Tribal Court before either the merits or any question concerning appropriate 
relief is addressed.”
65
 When “the federal court stays its hand until after the 
Tribal Court has had a full opportunity to determine its own jurisdiction[,]” 
the tribal judicial system has the chance “to rectify any errors it may have 
made.”
66
 And third, this rule will “encourage tribal courts to explain to the 
parties the precise basis for accepting jurisdiction, and will also provide 
other courts with the benefit of their expertise in such matters in the event 
of further judicial review.”
67
  
National Farmers also established three exceptions. First, a party need 
not litigate in tribal court if the invocation of tribal jurisdiction “is 
                                                                                                             
 59. Id. at 828. 
 60. Id. at 852. 
 61. Id. at 853–56. 
 62. Id. at 855–56. 
 63. Id. at 856. 
 64. Id. (citing, inter alia, Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959)); see supra notes 
44–48 (citing Williams v. Lee). 
 65. Nat’l Farmers Union, 471 U.S. at 856. 
 66. Id. at 857. 
 67. Id. 
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motivated by a desire to harass or is conducted in bad faith.”
68
 Second, 
there is no need to proceed in tribal court when it “is patently violative of 
express jurisdictional prohibitions.”
69
 And third, exhaustion is not necessary 
if it “would be futile because of the lack of an adequate opportunity to 
challenge the [tribal] court’s jurisdiction.”
70
  
The Court finished with procedural guidance to lower courts. If a lower 
court finds that tribal exhaustion did not occur, the lower court may dismiss 
or stay the case “pending the development of further Tribal Court 
proceedings.”
71
 After the tribal judicial process runs its course, the federal 
trial court may review the final decision.
72
  
C. Iowa Mutual 
In 1987, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Iowa Mutual, the next 
authoritative decision regarding tribal exhaustion. Iowa Mutual came before 
the Court on the question of whether the tribal remedies doctrine applies to 
a case where the federal trial court exercises diversity jurisdiction pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
73
 Like National Farmers, the case started with a motor 
vehicle accident in Montana.
74
 Edward LaPlante, a member of the Blackfeet 
Indian Tribe, worked on a ranch within the Blackfeet Indian Reservation’s 
boundaries and filed suit against his employer and its insurer in Blackfeet 
Tribal Court to recover for his injuries.
75
 The tribal court denied the 
insurer’s motion to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction; instead of 
waiting for a decision on the merits and appealing, the insurer initiated a 
federal court action in the District of Montana claiming jurisdiction based 
on diversity of citizenship under § 1332.
76
 The federal case sought a court 
declaration that the insurer did not have to pay for LaPlante’s injuries.
77
 
                                                                                                             
 68. Id. at 856 n.21 (quoting Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 338 (1977)); see also R. 
Mitchell McGrew, Note, Analysis of a Bias-Based Exception to the Doctrine of Exhaustion 
in Wilson v. Bull, 39 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 617, 624 (2014-2015). 
 69. Nat’l Farmers Union, 471 U.S. at 856 n.21. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 857. 
 72. Id.  
 73. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 11 (1987); see 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) 
(2018) (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the 
matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, 
and is between . . . citizens of different States . . . .”). 
 74. Iowa Mut., 480 U.S. at 11. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 12–13. 
 77. Id. 
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When LaPlante moved to dismiss the case on subject matter jurisdiction 
grounds, the district court granted the motion and highlighted the need to 
exhaust tribal remedies.
78




At the outset, the Court reemphasized the core of the doctrine—”the 
Federal Government’s longstanding policy of encouraging tribal self-
government.”
80
 Integral to this policy, “tribes retain ‘attributes of 
sovereignty over both their members and their territory,’ to the extent that 
sovereignty has not been withdrawn by federal statute or treaty.”
81
 Using 
state sovereignty to illustrate this point, Iowa Mutual explained that the 
“federal policy favoring tribal self-government operates even in areas 
where state control has not been affirmatively pre-empted by federal 
statute.”
82
 The Court then echoed Williams v. Lee’s holding that, “absent 
governing Acts of Congress, the question has always been whether the state 
action infringed on the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws 
and be ruled by them.”
83
  
Building on that foundation, the Court stated, “Tribal courts play a vital 
role in tribal self-government, and the Federal Government has consistently 
encouraged their development.”
84
 To underscore this point, the Court 
highlighted that, “[i]f state-court jurisdiction over Indians or activities on 
Indian lands would interfere with tribal sovereignty and self-government, 




The Court then turned to the issue presented and held that exhaustion in 
tribal courts is necessary when jurisdiction is based on § 1332.
86
 In fact, 
“[r]egardless of the basis for jurisdiction,” the rule articulated in National 
Farmers requires that the case go to tribal court.
87
 It is the “unconditional 
access” to a federal forum outside of the tribal judiciary that generates 
“direct competition with the tribal courts, thereby impairing the [tribal 
                                                                                                             
 78. Id. at 13. 
 79. Id. at 13–14. 
 80. Id. at 14. 
 81. Id. (citation omitted) (quoting United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 577 (1975)). 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. (internal alteration omitted) (quoting Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 
(1959)). 
 84. Id. at 14–15 (citation omitted). 
 85. Id. at 15 (citing Williams, 358 U.S. at 220). 
 86. Id. at 16. 
 87. Id. 
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courts’] authority over reservation affairs.”
88
 Elaborating on this holding, 
Iowa Mutual found that “[a]djudication of such matters by any nontribal 
court also infringes upon tribal law-making authority, because tribal courts 
are best qualified to interpret and apply tribal law.”
89
  
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s determination that there 
was no subject matter jurisdiction. Explaining National Farmers as a case 
that announced a “prudential rule[,]” the Court held that “considerations of 
comity direct that tribal remedies be exhausted.”
90
 So pursuing tribal court 
remedies “is required as a matter of comity, not as a jurisdictional 
prerequisite.”
91
 Iowa Mutual found that this made the doctrine “analogous 
to principles of abstention.”
92
 
Additionally, Iowa Mutual provided some practical clarifications. It 
made clear that the completion of appellate review in the tribe’s judiciary is 
necessary.
93
 And the Court reaffirmed National Farmers’ holding that 




Only Justice John Paul Stevens wrote a separate opinion, which 
concurred in part and dissented in part. Although the opinion concurred 
with the majority that there was subject matter jurisdiction, Justice Stevens 
dissented from the exhaustion analysis.
95
 In Justice Stevens’ view, the fact 
of concurrent jurisdiction between federal and tribal courts is not sufficient 
for mandating exhaustion of the tribal judicial process.
96
 Because the 
insurer’s federal case related to “the coverage of the insurance policy[,]” 
                                                                                                             
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 15, 21 n.14. 
 91. Id. at 21 n.8. 
“Comity,” in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the 
one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the other. But it is the 
recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, 
executive or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to 
international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens or of 
other persons who are under the protection of its laws. 
Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court for S. Dist., 482 U.S. 522, 
544 (1987) (quoting Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163–64 (1895)). 
 92. Iowa Mut., 480 U.S. at 16 n.8 (citing Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. 
United States, 424 U.S. 800, 819 (1976)); see infra Part III.  
 93. Iowa Mut., 480 U.S. at 16–17. 
 94. Id. at 19. 
 95. Id. at 20–21 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 96. Id.  
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Justice Stevens concluded it “raises no question concerning the jurisdiction 
of the Blackfeet Tribal Court.”
97
 
The dissenting aspect of the opinion understood the National Farmers 
decision to turn on the fact that a litigant is actively challenging tribal court 
jurisdiction.
98
 It noted that “a similar exhaustion requirement [is enforced] 
in cases challenging the jurisdiction of state tribunals.”
99
 “[A]s between 
state and federal courts,” Justice Stevens explained, “the general rule is that 
‘the pendency of an action in the state court is no bar to proceedings 
concerning the same matter in the Federal court having 
jurisdiction . . . .’”
100
 By requiring tribal exhaustion without a direct 
challenge to tribal jurisdiction, Justice Stevens found the Court advanced 
“the anomalous suggestion that the sovereignty of an Indian tribe is in some 




The last robust discussion of the tribal remedies doctrine by the Supreme 
Court came in the 1997 decision Strate v. A-1 Contractors. The case arose 
from an automobile collision between Gisela Fredericks and Lyle Stockert 
on a highway in North Dakota.
102
 It occurred at a point on the road within 
the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation, in a stretch of highway over which 
the United States granted North Dakota a right-of-way.
103
 While neither 
driver was a tribal member, Fredericks’ late husband and her five children 




Fredericks sued Stockert, his employer, and the employer’s insurer in the 
tribal court of the Three Affiliated Tribes.
105
 The suit included a loss of 
                                                                                                             
 97. Id. at 22  
 98. Id. at 21–22. 
 99. Id. at 21. 
 100. Id. at 22 (quoting McClellan v. Carland, 217 U.S. 268, 282 (1910)).  
 101. Id.  
 102. Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 442–43 (1997). 
 103. Id.  
 104. Id. at 443. The tribes are also known as the Mandan, Hidatsa, and Arikara Nation or 
the MHA Nation. Our Tribe, MHA NATION, https://www.mhanation.com/ (last visited Mar. 
16, 2020). This Article refers to the tribal nation as the Three Affiliated Tribes. See Indian 
Entities Recognized and Eligible to Receive Services from the United States Bureau of 
Indian Affairs, 81 Fed. Reg. 5019–25 (Jan. 29, 2016).  
 105. Strate, 520 U.S. at 443–44. For this discussion, the Article refers to Stockert, his 
employer, and the employer’s insurer collectively as A-1 Contractors. When the automobile 
collision occurred, Stockert was driving a gravel truck A-1 Contractors owned. Id. 
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consortium claim advanced by Fredericks’ children.
106
 A-1 Contractors 
argued there was no subject matter jurisdiction and moved to dismiss.
107
 
The tribal court denied the motion, which was later affirmed when the 




A-1 Contractors filed a federal lawsuit challenging the tribal 
proceedings, and once that case made its way to the Supreme Court, the 
core issue was whether the tribal court could exercise jurisdiction over 
Fredericks’ case.
109
 To answer that, the Supreme Court had to apply its 
Montana decision, which provides the decisive test for the limits of tribal 
civil authority.
110
 The Court’s decisions in National Farmers and Iowa 
Mutual became part of Strate’s analysis because Fredericks argued that 
those cases control and “broadly confirm tribal-court civil jurisdiction over 
claims against nonmembers arising from occurrences on any land within a 
reservation.”
111
 In rejecting Fredericks’ position, the Court traced the 
contours of National Farmers and Iowa Mutual.
112
 
The Court addressed National Farmers first. While National Farmers 
recognized “that tribal courts have more extensive jurisdiction in civil cases 
than in criminal proceedings, and . . . the need to inspect relevant statutes, 
treaties, and other materials” in assessing tribal court authority, Strate made 
clear that no part of National Farmers “limit[s] Montana’s instruction.”
113
 
Rather, National Farmers set forth “a prudential exhaustion rule, in 
deference to the capacity of tribal courts to explain to the parties the precise 
basis for accepting or rejecting jurisdiction.”
114
  
Turning to Iowa Mutual, the Court indicated the 1987 decision rested on 
the proposition that “[r]espect for tribal self-government made it 
appropriate to give the tribal court a full opportunity to determine its own 
                                                                                                             
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 444. 
 108. See id. at 445. 
 109. Id. at 442, 444. 
 110. See supra Section II.A. 
 111. Strate, 520 U.S. at 448.  
 112. Fredericks, along with the United States as amicus curiae, also argued that because 
the Court decided Montana in the context of tribal regulatory authority over nonmembers 
(i.e., issuance of hunting licenses), it does not squarely limit the adjudicatory authority of 
tribes. Id. at 447–48. Strate dismissed the argument. Id. at 453. The Court held that “[w]hile 
Montana immediately involved regulatory authority, the Court broadly addressed the 
concept of inherent sovereignty.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 113. Id. at 449. 
 114. Id. at 450 (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). 
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 Strate refused, however, to accept the argument that Iowa 
Mutual means “the Montana rule does not bear on tribal-court adjudicatory 
authority in cases involving nonmember defendants.”
116
 The Court clarified 
Iowa Mutual as holding the following: “where tribes possess authority to 
regulate the activities of nonmembers, civil jurisdiction over disputes 
arising out of such activities presumptively lies in the tribal courts.”
117
 
E. Remaining Decisions 
Since National Farmers, Iowa Mutual, and Strate, the Supreme Court 
has provided little guidance on the tribal remedies doctrine. The Court 
decided Neztsosie in 1999, which thoughtfully analyzed National Farmers 
before ultimately finding that the doctrine was inapplicable because “the 
comity rationale for tribal exhaustion normally appropriate to a tribal 
court’s determination of its jurisdiction stops short of the Price-Anderson 




The 2001 decision of Nevada v. Hicks did not require tribal exhaustion 
because the Court determined there was no tribal court jurisdiction. Hicks 
described Strate as “add[ing] a broader exception” to the doctrine: 
exhaustion is not necessary “‘when . . . it is plain that no federal grant 
provides for tribal governance of nonmembers’ conduct on land covered by 
Montana’s main rule,’” because it “would serve no purpose other than 
delay.”
119
 While not the opinion of the Court, Justice Sandra Day 
                                                                                                             
 115. Id. at 451 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 116. Id. at 451–52. 
 117. Id. at 453 (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). 
 118. El Paso Nat. Gas Co. v. Neztsosie, 526 U.S. 473, 484–85, 487 (1999) (“[T]he Price-
Anderson Act transforms into a federal action ‘any public liability action arising out of or 
resulting from a nuclear incident,’ § 2210(n)(2). The Act not only gives a district court 
original jurisdiction over such a claim, but provides for removal to a federal court as of right 
if a putative Price-Anderson action is brought in a state court. Congress thus expressed an 
unmistakable preference for a federal forum, at the behest of the defending party, both for 
litigating a Price-Anderson claim on the merits and for determining whether a claim falls 
under Price-Anderson when removal is contested.”) (citations omitted). 
 119. Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 369 (2001). Rather than a “broader exception,” this 
quoted portion of Strate may be understood as an explanation of how an exception 
established in National Farmers may apply. In Strate, the quote cites to the National 
Farmers footnote articulating the three exceptions. The Strate quote—holding that 
exhaustion is unnecessary when the tribal court clearly lacks jurisdiction—fits within the 
second National Farmers exception for cases where “the [tribal] action is patently violative 
of express jurisdictional prohibitions.” Nat’l Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of 
Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 856 n.21 (1985). 
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O’Connor, in a concurrence joined by Justice Stevens and Justice Stephen 
G. Breyer, explained National Farmers and Iowa Mutual as relating to state 
courts—”In determining the relationship between tribal courts and state and 




Since the cases discussed above, the Supreme Court has touched on the 
tribal remedies doctrine in passing but has not tested its principles.
121
 In the 
meantime, state courts have been grappling with the Supreme Court’s 
rulings, and the array of outcomes shows that the doctrine is subject to 
different interpretations. 
III. State Courts and the Doctrine’s Applicability  
On the issue of whether the tribal exhaustion doctrine applies to state 
courts, eighteen state courts have addressed the question to varying degrees 
of depth.
122
 Five state courts held that the doctrine applies. Six might also 
come to that determination, but their decisions have not engaged with the 
doctrine such that they can be grouped with the five jurisdictions applying 
tribal exhaustion, so these six are labeled as “maybe.” There are three state 
courts that address the doctrine’s principles but do not decide the issue. 
Finally, in four states, the courts held the doctrine does not apply. The 
following section discusses these categories in reverse order, finishing with 
the Utah Supreme Court’s Harvey decision.
123
 
A. Does Not Apply: 4 
1. Oklahoma 
The Court of Civil Appeals of Oklahoma, the state’s intermediate 
appellate court, held in Michael Minnis & Associates, P.C. v. Kaw Nation 
that “the exhaustion doctrine does not apply in state court actions.”
124
 Prior 
                                                                                                             
 120. Hicks, 533 U.S. at 398 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment). 
 121. See, e.g., Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 556 U.S. 635, 639 (2009). 
 122. See COHEN, supra note 15, § 6.04[3][c], at 559–61 (Nell Jessup Newton et al. eds., 
2012) (discussing some state courts that have addressed the doctrine); id. § 7.04[3], at 630–
36 (same). 
 123. Appendix I provides a visual depiction of the discussion in this section. Comparing 
Appendix II, which displays the presence of tribes in the country state-by-state, to Appendix 
I reveals that many states with tribes in their borders have yet to weigh in on the 
applicability of the tribal remedies doctrine.  
 124. Michael Minnis & Assocs., P.C. v. Kaw Nation, 2004 OK CIV APP 36, ¶ 18, 90 
P.3d 1009, 1014. 
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to appeal, the trial judge dismissed the case against the Kaw Nation; the 
appellate decision does not reveal the basis for dismissal, but the motion to 
dismiss raised, inter alia, tribal sovereign immunity and exhaustion of tribal 
remedies.
125
 The Michael Minnis court did not provide a detailed 
explanation for its conclusion on the tribal remedies doctrine.
126
 However, 
the court viewed the case as turning on the issue of sovereign immunity and 
affirmed the trial judge’s dismissal order in concluding the “state court 
action is barred” without “a valid, express waiver of tribal sovereign 





The Louisiana Supreme Court issued a 2008 decision where it declined 
to apply the tribal remedies doctrine.
128
 The court’s then-Chief Justice, 
Pascal F. Calogero, Jr., concurred and specifically determined that the 
doctrine is inapplicable.
129
 To support this conclusion, the concurrence cites 
the Oklahoma Michael Minnis decision and the U.S. Supreme Court case 
Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Manufacturing Technologies.
130
 The 
concurrence discusses Kiowa Tribe at length, noting how the decision 
centered on sovereign immunity and “does not even mention the exhaustion 
of tribal remedies doctrine in relation to a suit against an Indian Tribe filed 
in a state court.”
131
 “Based on that fact,” Chief Justice Calogero “would 
find that the exhaustion doctrine does not apply in state courts.”
132
 Justice 
Catherine D. Kimball, joined by now-Chief Justice Bernette J. Johnson, 
issued a comprehensive dissenting opinion largely tracking the Connecticut 
Supreme Court’s ruling in Drumm v. Brown.
133
 Justice John L. Weimer 
dissented separately and appeared to support applying the doctrine without 
                                                                                                             
 125. Id. ¶¶ 7–20, 90 P.3d at 1012–14. 
 126. Id. ¶¶ 13–20, 90 P.3d at 1013–14. 
 127. Id. ¶ 21, 90 P.3d at 1015.  
 128. Meyer & Assocs., Inc. v. Coushatta Tribe of La., 2007-2256, p. 5 (La. 9/23/08); 992 
So. 2d 446, 451–52. 
 129. Id., 992 So. 2d at 452 (Calogero, C.J., additionally concurring and assigning 
additional reasons). 
 130. Id., 992 So. 2d at 452–53. 
 131. Id., 992 So. 2d at 452. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. at pp. 6–13, 992 So. 2d at 453–62 (Kimball, J. dissenting) (discussing Drumm v. 
Brown, 716 A.2d 50 (Conn. 1998), a leading state court case adopting the tribal remedies 
doctrine); see infra notes 175–78 and accompanying text.  
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 Justice Weimer concluded that the tribal court must 
be the first to assess the sovereign immunity question,
135
 but if there is a 




In Astorga v. Wing, an intermediate court in Arizona had a case where it 
determined it need not implement the tribal remedies doctrine.
137
 The case 
involved “an Indian plaintiff fil[ing] suit in state court against a non-Indian 
defendant” and an ongoing parallel case in tribal court.
138
 The plaintiffs 
appealed the state trial court’s refusal to stay the state case, and the 
reviewing court found that “there is no need to invoke the exhaustion 
requirement to protect the ability of the tribal court to determine in the first 
instance the facts and the law pertaining to whether it has jurisdiction[,]” 
because “[t]he tribal court will presumably decide the jurisdictional issue in 
the parallel proceeding that is before it, as the exhaustion doctrine 
requires.”
139
 Citing a prior Arizona Supreme Court case, the court 
concluded that “the principle of exhaustion recognized by federal courts in 




In Maxa v. Yakima Petroleum, Inc., a Washington intermediate appellate 
court found the tribal remedies doctrine inapplicable.
141
 Maxa held that 
National Farmers and Iowa Mutual were inapposite because, unlike Maxa, 
those “cases involve federal jurisdiction issues[,]” and “[s]tate civil 
adjudicatory authority over litigation involving tribe members, on the other 
                                                                                                             
 134. Id. at p. 13, 992 So. 2d at 462 (Weimer, J., dissenting) (“Because I believe this 
threshold [sovereign immunity] question involving tribal law should be resolved by the tribal 
court, I would find the tribal court had jurisdiction to initially determine the validity of the 
agreements at issue.”). 
 135. Id.  
 136. Id.  
 137. 118 P.3d 1103, 1106–08 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005). Astorga is cited for this holding in 
Harvey v. Ute Indian Tribe of Uintah & Ouray Reservation, 2017 UT 75, ¶¶ 93–94, 416 
P.3d 401 (Himonas, J., concurring), and id. ¶ 123 (Lee, A.C.J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
 138. Astorga, 118 P.3d at 1107. 
 139. Id.  
 140. Id. at 1106 (citing State v. Zaman, 946 P.2d 459, 463 (Ariz. 1997)). 
 141. Maxa v. Yakima Petroleum, Inc., 924 P.2d 372, 373 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996). Maxa 
is referred to for this proposition in Harvey, 2017 UT 75, ¶ 128 n.16 (Lee, A.C.J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part), and Drumm v. Brown, 716 A.2d 50, 61 n.11 (Conn. 1998). 
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hand, is not specifically preempted by federal law.”
142
 The court 
additionally held that its choice to exercise jurisdiction accorded with 
Williams v. Lee, because the case involved a contract dispute the state had 




B. Not Decided or Unclear: 3 
1. Mississippi 
The Mississippi Supreme Court decided Harrison v. Boyd Miss., Inc., in 
1997, and did not rule on the applicability of tribal exhaustion.
144
 The court 
“note[d] the line of Federal cases requiring the exhaustion of tribal 
remedies prior to review by Federal Courts[,]” and found that “[s]ince no 
companion case is pending in tribal court, this doctrine is not applicable in 
the case sub judice.”
145
 Justice Fred L. Banks, Jr., concurred in part, which 
Chief Justice Dan M. Lee joined, finding that the majority did not need to 
resolve whether the tribal court had jurisdiction—that it was sufficient to 
find the state court “did have jurisdiction and that no principle of comity 
required that it relinquish that jurisdiction.”
146
 Justice James W. Smith, Jr., 
published a dissent urging the majority to embrace the tribal remedies 
doctrine.
147
 In Justice Smith’s view, “Under the doctrine of comity, the 
recognition of the judicial independence of another sovereign, courts should 
not exercise jurisdiction over civil cases where those cases are subject to 
tribal jurisdiction, until tribal remedies have been exhausted.”
148
  
2. New Mexico 
New Mexico state courts have not made a clear decision on the doctrine 
one way or the other. In Tempest Recovery Services, Inc. v. Belone, the 
Supreme Court of New Mexico employed the Williams v. Lee infringement 
test and found that the state court could exercise jurisdiction when it had 
concurrent jurisdiction with the tribal court.
149
 Within its decision, the 
Tempest Recovery court included a footnote “recogniz[ing]” that “federal 
courts apply an ‘exhaustion doctrine,’ which allows for a tribal court to 
                                                                                                             
 142. Maxa, 924 P.2d at 373. 
 143. Id. at 374. 
 144. Harrison v. Boyd Miss., Inc., 700 So. 2d 247, 251 n.3 (Miss. 1997). 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. at 252 (Banks, J., concurring in part). 
 147. Id. at 254–55 (Smith, J., dissenting). 
 148. Id. at 254. 
 149. Tempest Recovery Servs., Inc. v. Belone, 74 P.3d 67, 69–72 (N.M. 2003). 
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determine its jurisdiction before a federal court will exercise its own 
jurisdiction in cases where concurrent jurisdiction may exist.”
150
 No further 
comment on the doctrine followed. 
But six years later, New Mexico’s intermediate appellate court decided 
Martinez v. Cities of Gold Casino, where the parties directly raised the issue 
of tribal exhaustion.
151
 The Martinez court determined it need “not reach 
[the] argument concerning exhaustion of tribal remedies” because sovereign 
immunity was not waived.
152
 Although this is not close to a ruling 
embracing the doctrine, it is notable that, in the context of a party urging the 
court to “adopt the exhaustion rule set forth in National Farmers[,]” the 
court did not cite Tempest Recovery, instead treating the issue as unresolved 
for New Mexico state courts.
153
 
3. New York 
A New York court addressed the tribal remedies doctrine and observed 
that another state court has held that it applies as substantive federal law.
154
 
Even if the court “assum[ed] that the rule is a substantive federal law made 
binding on state courts pursuant to the Supremacy Clause[,]” the court 
“conclude[d] that it d[id] not apply to th[e] case because there [was] no 
action pending in a Seneca Nation tribal court.”
155
 
C. Maybe Applies: 6 
1. Minnesota 
The intermediate appellate courts of Minnesota apply the tribal remedies 
doctrine.
156
 In Gavle v. Little Six, Inc., however, Minnesota’s Supreme 
Court discussed the doctrine as though it was a sub-component of the 
                                                                                                             
 150. Id. at 72 n.3.  
 151. Martinez v. Cities of Gold Casino, 215 P.3d 44, 53 (N.M. Ct. App. 2009). 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id.  
 154. Seneca v. Seneca, 741 N.Y.S.2d 375, 379 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002) (citing Drumm v. 
Brown, 716 A.2d 50, 61–64 (Conn. 1998)).  
 155. Id.  
 156. See, e.g., Matsch v. Prairie Island Indian Cmty., 567 N.W.2d 276, 278 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 1997) (requiring tribal exhaustion); Klammer v. Lower Sioux Convenience Store, 535 
N.W.2d 379, 381 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (same); see also Lower Sioux Indian Cmty. v. 
Kraus-Anderson Const. Co., No. A09-777, 2010 WL 696392, at *4 (Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 2, 
2010) (same). Klammer makes the important point that the doctrine applies even if the state 
court exercises jurisdiction based on Public Law 280, 535 N.W.2d at 383–84, because, as 
Iowa Mutual held, the doctrine has relevance “[r]egardless of the basis for jurisdiction,” 
Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 16 (1987). 
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broader Williams v. Lee infringement principle.
157
 Despite finding 
concurrent jurisdiction between state and tribal courts, the court did not 





The Supreme Court of Idaho observed in Coeur d’Alene Tribe v. 
Johnson that the “[U.S.] Supreme Court has never specifically held that this 
doctrine applies to the states, and it is unclear whether it does.”
159
 However, 
the court went on to note “[t]he reasoning in Drumm is persuasive as it 
analyzes the application of the exhaustion doctrine in a situation similar to 
the present case.”
160
 The Johnson court especially embraced Drumm’s 
conclusion that “the doctrine is only applicable when there is pending 
litigation in tribal court.”
161
 Because there was no pending tribal case in 




While Iowa’s intermediate court of appeals did not formally adopt the 
tribal remedies doctrine, it may have implicitly done so when it determined 




In Thomas v. Thomas, the Supreme Court of Nebraska refused to reach 
the merits because the case was moot.
164
 Thomas noted, however, that the 
lower court “declined to exercise jurisdiction because appellant failed to 
exhaust [his] Tribal Court remedies regarding the existence and extent of 
the subject matter jurisdiction of the Coeur D’Alene Tribal Court and the 
                                                                                                             
 157. Gavle v. Little Six, Inc., 555 N.W.2d 284, 292 (Minn. 1996). See supra Section 
II.A. 
 158. Gavle, 555 N.W.2d at 292. Drumm cites Gavle as a case finding “the exhaustion 
doctrine is not applicable to state courts.” Drumm, 716 A.2d at 61 n.11. 
 159. Coeur d’Alene Tribe v. Johnson, 405 P.3d 13, 18 (Idaho 2017) (citing Drumm, 716 
A.2d at 61). 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. at 19.  
 163. Wasker, Dorr, Wimmer & Marcouiller, P.C. v. Bear, No. 04-1917, 2006 WL 
3017875, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 25, 2006) (“We affirm denial of the motion to dismiss 
for want of jurisdiction based upon the futility of attempting to try an issue in a nonexistent 
tribal court.”). 
 164. Thomas v. Thomas, 453 N.W.2d 752, 754 (1990). 
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District Court of Knox County, Nebraska relied upon the authority of 
National Farmers.”
165
 Although the appellant challenged this 
determination, the Thomas court made no comment on it, found the case 
moot, and affirmed the lower court.
166
  
5. South Dakota 
The Supreme Court of South Dakota quoted National Farmers in 
addressing “the question of whether [it] has jurisdiction to review the 
validity of tribal court proceedings[,]” and the court “acknowledge[d] that 
the ‘forum whose jurisdiction is being challenged [should have] the first 
opportunity to evaluate the factual and legal basis for the challenge.’”
167
 
The citation to National Farmers was followed with a parenthetical, which 
noted that in that case the U.S. Supreme Court “declin[ed] to consider relief 
until tribal court remedies are exhausted.”
168
 The court did not definitively 
embrace the doctrine.  
In Calvello v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, the Supreme Court of South Dakota 
held in part that, if the appellant had a legitimate suit against the tribe, he 
had to seek it in tribal court.
169
 The court supported this determination by 
stating that “[i]n matters involving commercial relations, it has long been 
acknowledged that ‘subject[ing] a dispute arising on a reservation . . . to a 
forum other than the one they have established for themselves,’ may 
‘undermine the authority of the tribal cour[t] . . . and hence . . . infringe on 
the right of the Indians to govern themselves.’”
170
 This statement relied on a 
string citation, which included National Farmers and two federal district 
court cases with explanatory parentheticals suggesting the tribal remedies 
doctrine applies to state courts.
171
 
                                                                                                             
 165. Id. (alteration in original) (citing Nat’l Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of 
Indians, 471 U.S. 845 (1985)). 
 166. Id.  
 167. In re Estate of Colombe, 885 N.W.2d 350, 357 (S.D. 2016) (alteration in original) 
(quoting Nat’l Farmers Union, 471 U.S. at 856). 
 168. Id. 
 169. 1998 S.D. 107, ¶ 22, 584 N.W.2d 108, 116. 
 170. Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 59 
(1978)). 
 171. Id. (citing Bowen v. Doyle, 880 F. Supp. 99, 123 (W.D.N.Y. 1995) (even if state 
court has jurisdiction and matter is not currently pending before tribal court, state courts 
must abstain from hearing suits arising on reservations until after tribal courts have resolved 
the issue); Smith v. Babbitt, 875 F. Supp. 1353, 1366–67 (D. Minn. 1995) (non-tribal court 
must abstain from hearing matter arising on Indian land until plaintiff has exhausted 
remedies in tribal court)). The parentheticals are presented as they appear verbatim in 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol44/iss2/3




In Teague v. Bad River Band of Lake Superior Tribe of Chippewa 
Indians, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin recognized that both the state and 
tribe had legitimate claims to jurisdiction, so it “conclude[d] that principles 
of comity in this situation required the circuit and tribal courts to confer for 
purposes of jurisdiction allocation prior to proceeding to judgment.”
172
 The 
court “remand[ed] to the circuit court to convene such a conference, at 
which the respective courts will weigh considerations of comity and tribal 
exhaustion to determine whether the judgments should be reopened for 
purposes of jurisdiction allocation and retrial.”
173
 Teague does not 
concretely hold that the doctrine applies in Wisconsin state court, but there 
is the suggestion, and at least one commentator noticed.
174
  
D. Does Apply: 5 
1. Connecticut 
One of the leading state court cases adopting the tribal exhaustion 
doctrine is the Connecticut Supreme Court’s 1998 decision in Drumm v. 
Brown.
175
 In evaluating National Farmers, Iowa Mutual, and other relevant 
cases, the Drumm court found “strong suggestions” that the doctrine 
constitutes substantive federal law “binding in state courts pursuant to the 
supremacy clause of the federal constitution.”
176
 Putting that question aside, 
                                                                                                             
Calvello. However, a recent case that did not discuss the tribal remedies doctrine could cast 
doubt on whether the doctrine applies in South Dakota. See also Stathis v. Marty Indian 
Sch., 2019 S.D. 33, 930 N.W.2d 653 (finding federal law preempted state jurisdiction, 
without deciding whether Williams v. Lee barred suit of former high school principal against 
Marty Indian School; no discussion of tribal courts or exhaustion).  
 172. 2000 WI 79, ¶ 41, 612 N.W.2d 709, 720. 
 173. Id. at 720–21; Carol Tebben, Trifederalism in the Aftermath of Teague: The 
Interaction of State and Tribal Courts in Wisconsin, 26 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 177, 181 (2001-
2002) (“The case was remanded to the state trial court judge with instructions to hold a 
conference with the tribal judge to determine, under principles of comity and 
tribal exhaustion, which court should appropriately maintain jurisdiction of the litigation.”). 
A subsequent decision from the Supreme Court of Wisconsin regarding this case referred to 
the conference as “the comity conference.” Teague v. Bad River Band of Lake Superior 
Tribe of Chippewa Indians, 2003 WI 118, ¶ 5, 665 N.W.2d 899, 903. 
 174. Bryan Cahill, Note, Teague v. Bad River Band of Lake Superior Tribe of Chippewa 
Indians: Bringing the Federal Exhaustion Rule of Tribal Remedies Home to Wisconsin 
Courts, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 1291, 1324–25 (“By remanding, the court subtly suggested the 
desired outcome—tribal remedies should have been exhausted.”). 
 175. 716 A.2d 50, 54–55 (Conn. 1998)). 
 176. Id. at 62–63. 
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Drumm held that deference to “the federal policy of supporting tribal self-
government . . . counsels that [the court] also adopt the doctrine for the 
courts of [Connecticut].”
177
 In addition, the Drumm court analyzed whether 
a pending tribal court case is required before nontribal courts order 
exhaustion, finding “that exhaustion is not required in the absence of a 
pending action in the tribal court.”
178
  
2. North Dakota 
Without providing thorough analysis like Drumm, the Supreme Court of 




In an unpublished decision, a California intermediate appellate court 
determined that the doctrine was applicable, simply stating it “applies in 




Within the specific context of an Indian Child Welfare Act child custody 
proceeding, the Supreme Court of Alaska held that it adopts the doctrine 
and “will not allow a party to challenge a tribal court’s judgment in an 
ICWA-defined child custody proceeding in Alaska state court without first 




                                                                                                             
 177. Id. at 63. 
 178. Id. at 64. 
 179. Fredericks v. Eide-Kirschmann Ford, Mercury, Lincoln, Inc., 462 N.W.2d 164, 169 
(N.D. 1990); see also State ex rel. Olson v. Harrison, 2001 ND 99, ¶ 18, 627 N.W.2d 153, 
158 (“In Fredericks, 462 N.W.2d at 168, we held Eide should have exhausted its tribal court 
remedies . . . .”) (citing Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9 (1987); Nat’l Farmers 
Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845 (1985)). 
 180. Rivera v. Hopland Band of Pomo Indians Econ. Dev. Corp., No. A114858, 2007 
WL 2310773, at *4 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 14, 2007) (“The doctrine applies even when a tribal 
agency other than a tribal court arguably has jurisdiction . . . and applies in state court as 
well as federal court . . . .”) (citation omitted). However, in a published decision from 
California’s intermediate court, the court declined to decide whether the doctrine applies and 
further found “exhaustion of tribal court remedies is not required when no tribal 
court existed at the time the action was commenced.” Findleton v. Coyote Valley Band of 
Pomo Indians, 238 Cal. Rptr. 3d 346, 354 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018), as modified (Sept. 26, 2018). 
 181. Simmonds v. Parks, 329 P.3d 995, 1007–08 (Alaska 2014). 
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The Supreme Court of Utah’s decision in Harvey provides the most 
recent comprehensive decision regarding the doctrine.
182
 Because that 
decision is a focal point of this Article, it is discussed below in detail. 
a) Harvey v. Ute Tribe 
(1) Utah Supreme Court decision 
The genesis of the Harvey case involves the oil and gas industry in the 
Uintah Basin and the industry’s reliance on land within the Uintah and 
Ouray Reservation of the Ute Indian Tribe.
183
 Ryan Harvey owns 
businesses supplying “dirt, sand, and gravel” and leasing equipment to oil 
and gas companies.
184
 Harvey’s businesses are not on tribal land, but “the 
items they sell and lease are often used on tribal land by the leasing or 
buying companies.”
185
 Although Harvey’s “businesses did not operate 
directly on tribal land,” a Commissioner with the Ute Tribal Employment 
Rights Office (UTERO) required him to obtain a Ute Business License over 
his objection.
186
 The Commissioner then claimed Harvey obtained a forged 
license, but the two met and the Commissioner let go of that belief.
187
 
Harvey and the Commissioner had another interaction later where Harvey 
understood the Commissioner to be asking for a bribe, which he did not 
pay.
188
 Eventually, Harvey received a letter from UTERO revoking his 
reservation access permit and alleging his businesses were operating in 
violation of a UTERO ordinance.
189
 UTERO also distributed a letter to oil 
and gas companies indicating Harvey’s businesses lacked access permits 
and warning that penalties would be imposed if other companies used 
Harvey’s businesses.
190




                                                                                                             
 182. Harvey v. Ute Indian Tribe of Uintah & Ouray Reservation, 2017 UT 75, 416 P.3d 
401; see id. ¶¶ 91–108 (Himonas, J., concurring). 
 183. Id. ¶ 1 (majority opinion). 
 184. Id. ¶ 5. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. ¶ 6. 
 187. Id. ¶ 7. 
 188. Id. ¶ 8.  
 189. Id. ¶ 9. 
 190. Id. ¶ 10. 
 191. Id. ¶¶ 11–12. 
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The lawsuit took aim at the Ute Tribe and tribal officials, claiming they 
exceeded their jurisdiction and committed various torts.
192
 The defendants 
filed motions to dismiss, including a motion arguing Harvey failed to 
exhaust tribal remedies.
193
 While the Utah trial court did not issue a direct 
ruling on tribal exhaustion, the Utah Supreme Court found it “essentially 
did so in substance” by stating that “Harvey’s claim that the tribal officials 
exceeded the jurisdiction of the tribe or acted outside the scope of their 
authority under tribal law must be addressed in the tribal court.”
194
 The 
Utah Supreme Court took up that issue on appeal. 
As a legal opinion, Harvey has a “somewhat unique character.”
195
 All 
sitting members of the court concurred in the majority opinion, except two 
justices dissented from the ruling on the tribal remedies doctrine.
196
 That 
ruling in the majority opinion had the support of the two members joining 
the entirety of the opinion of the court, as well as a concurrence from 
Justice Constandinos Himonas, who “concur[red] in all of the analysis in 
the majority opinion and [wrote] separately to further explain his reasons 
for joining.”
197




On the issue of exhausting tribal remedies, the majority opinion began by 
identifying the challenged actions of the Ute Tribe as central to its right to 
self-govern because “the actions Harvey complain[ed] of relate to the 
ability of the Ute Tribe to exclude non-Indians from their reservation.”
199
 
The majority isolated the three principles underlying the doctrine, finding 
all three support applying the doctrine.
200
 First, requiring exhaustion 
promotes tribal self-government—”as a matter of comity, the tribe should 
be given the first right to interpret the . . . letter [to oil and gas companies] 
and determine the tribe’s jurisdiction” in that exercise of power.
201
 Second, 
exhaustion is efficient because it allows the tribal court “to interpret the 
tribe’s order and vet the factual challenge to the tribe’s jurisdiction as a 
                                                                                                             
 192. Id. ¶ 12. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. ¶ 13. 
 195. Id. ¶ 3. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. ¶ 43. 
 200. Id. ¶ 49 (analogizing the case to Burlington N. R.R. v. Crow Tribal Council, 940 
F.2d 1239, 1246 (9th Cir. 1991)). 
 201. Id. 
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matter of judicial economy.”
202
 And third, “forcing Harvey to litigate in 
tribal court provides clarity to the parties and any reviewing court on how 
the tribe views its own jurisdiction.”
203
 The majority would require 
exhaustion despite the absence of a case pending in tribal court.
204
 
Justice Himonas’s concurrence, which is an arm of the majority opinion, 
expounded on the antecedent issue of whether to apply the tribal remedies 
doctrine in the first place. According to Justice Himonas, the “express 
language” of Iowa Mutual makes the doctrine applicable;
205
 specifically, 
Iowa Mutual’s statement that exhaustion is necessary for “any nontribal 
court.”
206
 Justice Himonas explained that requiring exhaustion accords with 
the policy of limiting state control over tribes.
207
 Otherwise, state courts 
would be “in a superior position to federal courts in hearing cases that 
implicate tribal jurisdiction[,]” which would “give rise to a scheme where 
plaintiffs overwhelmingly chose to litigate in state court instead of tribal 
court—a state of affairs that would wholly subvert the federal policy of 
encouraging the development of tribal court systems.”
208
 Noting that a state 
court’s “control over litigation that could also proceed in tribal court . . . has 
the exact same effect on tribal self-determination as when a federal court 
assumes such control[,]” Justice Himonas concluded, “[T]he tribal 
exhaustion rule admits of no distinction between federal and state 
courts . . . .”
209
  
In contrast to the dissenting opinion, the concurrence stated that 
analogizing the tribal remedies doctrine to exhaustion of administrative 
remedies is inaccurate and fails to appreciate “tribes’ unique status and 
history—a status and history that should inform how we construe legal 
terms imported from other areas of law into the Indian law context.”
210
 The 
concurrence also found tribal exhaustion is not akin to abstention because 
that involves a court “balanc[ing] multiple factors, including judicial 
economy concerns and the avoidance of piecemeal litigation.”
211
 Instead of 
“a multifactorial, abstention-style balancing test to determine when 
                                                                                                             
 202. Id. ¶ 50. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. ¶ 51. 
 205. Id. ¶ 95 (Himonas, J., concurring). 
 206. Id. ¶ 93 (citing Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 16 (1987); Nevada v. 
Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 398 (2001) (O’Connor, J., concurring)). 
 207. Id. ¶ 96 (Himonas, J., concurring). 
 208. Id. ¶ 97. 
 209. Id. ¶ 98. 
 210. Id. ¶ 103. 
 211. Id. ¶ 106. 
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exhaustion is appropriate[,]” the tribal remedies doctrine mandates 
exhaustion of tribal remedies.
212
 
Associate Chief Justice Thomas R. Lee, joined by Chief Justice Matthew 
B. Durrant, issued an opinion dissenting from the majority’s tribal 
exhaustion analysis. On tribal exhaustion, the dissent emphasized that the 
U.S. Supreme Court “has never considered the important question 
presented here.”
213
 Without “a controlling statute or binding precedent from 
the U.S. Supreme Court,” the dissent took “to decid[ing] how to balance the 
needed deference to the sovereignty and jurisdiction of the tribal courts.”
214
 
The dissent determined that the doctrine established in National Farmers 
and Iowa Mutual is “a matter of federal Indian law” that does not apply to 
state courts.
215
 Drawing on Utah “common law authority[,]” the dissent 
would “conclude that [Utah] courts should stay [their] exercise of 
jurisdiction only after one of the parties has invoked the jurisdiction of the 
tribal courts.”
216
 In the dissent’s view, the language Justice Himonas relied 
on in Iowa Mutual is dicta that does not “extend to a case like” Harvey.
217
 
The dissent likened the tribal remedies doctrine to administrative 
exhaustion; it stated that because exhaustion “is a principle that regulates 
the timing of proceedings in tribunals that operate in a hierarchical 
relationship,” it should not bind state courts because that structure does not 
exist between state and tribal courts.
218
 Even if the holdings of National 
Farmers and Iowa Mutual apply to state courts, the dissent “would not 
interpret those cases to require exhaustion in the absence of a pending case 
filed in tribal courts.”
219
  
According to the dissent, the three reasons National Farmers articulated 
as undergirding tribal exhaustion also support demanding a pending tribal 
case.
220
 For instance, National Farmers was concerned with “the need to 
allow the ‘forum whose jurisdiction is being challenged’” to assess its own 
authority, but that concern does not manifest until a tribal case gets filed.
221
 
Within this discussion, the dissent compared the doctrine to abstention 
                                                                                                             
 212. Id. ¶ 107. 
 213. Id. ¶ 124 (Lee, A.C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 214. Id. ¶ 128. 
 215. Id. ¶ 117. 
 216. Id. ¶ 118. 
 217. Id. ¶ 121. 
 218. Id. 
 219. Id. ¶ 130. 
 220. Id. ¶¶ 132–141. 
 221. Id. ¶ 138 (quoting Nat’l Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 
845, 856 (1985)). 
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because they “are closely related doctrines” that are “based on concerns 
regarding comity and deference to ongoing judicial proceedings.”
222
 The 
dissent asserted that forcing the defendants “to file a declaratory suit in 
tribal court[,]” which they so far “declined to file[,]” would “overrid[e]” 
their “right of self-governance.”
223
 
(2) U.S. Supreme Court Petition for Certiorari 
Harvey sought review of the Utah Supreme Court’s decision by filing a 
petition for writ of certiorari with the U.S. Supreme Court. The petition 
presented two questions: 
1. Whether the tribal remedies exhaustion doctrine, which 
requires federal courts to stay cases challenging tribal 
jurisdiction until the parties have exhausted parallel tribal 
court proceedings, applies to state courts as well. 
2. Whether the tribal remedies exhaustion doctrine requires 
that nontribal courts yield to tribal courts when the parties 
have not invoked the tribal court’s jurisdiction.
224
 
The petition claimed the Utah Supreme Court answered both questions 
incorrectly, placing it in tension with various state and federal courts.
225
 
Much of the petition’s argument relied on Associate Chief Justice Lee’s 
dissent.
226
 In support of Harvey’s petition, the State of Utah filed a brief as 
amicus curiae.
227
 Utah focused on state sovereignty and argued that the 
Harvey decision diminishes Utah’s sovereignty.
228
 
Before ruling on the petition, the Supreme Court issued an order inviting 
a brief from the Office of the Solicitor General to set out the views of the 
United States.
229
 The Solicitor General argued for denial of the petition.
230
 
                                                                                                             
 222. Id. ¶ 135. 
 223. Id. ¶ 142.  
 224. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Harvey v. UTE Indian Tribe of the Uintah & Ouray 
Reservation, 139 S. Ct. 784 (2018) (No. 17-1301), 2018 WL 1327120, at *i. 
 225. Id. at *16–33. 
 226. Id. 
 227. Brief of the State of Utah as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Harvey v. UTE 
Indian Tribe of the Uintah & Ouray Reservation, 139 S. Ct. 784 (2018) (No. 17-1301), 2018 
WL 1850971. 
 228. Id. at *8–9. 
 229. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Harvey v. UTE Indian Tribe of the 
Uintah & Ouray Reservation, 139 S. Ct. 784 (2019) (No. 17-1301), 2018 WL 6382963, at 
*1. 
 230. Id.  
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On the first question presented, the government noted that Iowa Mutual’s 
treatment of tribal exhaustion reveals that it “applies as a matter of ‘federal 
policy’ when necessary to prevent ‘direct competition with the tribal courts’ 
by ‘any nontribal court’—which would appear to include a state court—on 
matters of tribal ‘authority over reservation affairs.’”
231
 Despite state courts 
resolving questions relating to tribal exhaustion differently, the government 
asserted that, rather than squarely ruling on the issue like the Utah Supreme 
Court, other relevant state court decisions “relied on multiple 
considerations—often drawing simultaneously on related Indian-law 
doctrines, such as the Williams v. Lee infringement test . . . in deciding 
whether to stay state-court proceedings in favor of proceedings in tribal 
court.”
232
 The government understood “[t]he differing outcomes in those 




Turning to the second question presented, the government contended 
“the justification for abstaining in favor of tribal-court proceedings under 
the specific rationales of National Farmers and [Iowa Mutual] would 
appear ordinarily to depend on whether tribal-court proceeding are, in fact, 
pending.”
234
 The government argued that without a pending “tribal-court 
proceeding[,] . . . adjudication of the parties’ claims by a non-tribal court 
would not create any ‘direct competition’ with tribal courts.”
235
 And “where 
a non-Indian attempts to sue a tribe or tribal member in state court 
concerning on-reservation conduct (whether or not there is a pending tribal-
court proceeding), any bar to the state court’s adjudication of the case 
would normally be based . . . on Williams v. Lee,” and its ruling “that suits 




The government also pointed out that the “Court has concluded that state 
courts may resolve disputes involving tribes and tribal members concerning 
access to a reservation, where the cause of action arose outside of Indian 
country.”
237
 The Court additionally “approved the exercise of jurisdiction 
by state courts over claims by Indians against non-Indians, even when those 
                                                                                                             
 231. Id. at *12 (quoting Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 16 (1987)). 
 232. Id. at *18. 
 233. Id. 
 234. Id. at *12. 
 235. Id. (quoting Iowa Mut., 480 U.S. at 16). 
 236. Id. at *12–13 (citation omitted). 
 237. Id. at *13. 
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claims arose in Indian country.”
238
 Moreover, the government argued, a 
state court is free to decide “suits that implicate tribal interests[,]” and, “if 
necessary to resolve state-law claims[,]” it may interpret tribal law as it 
would proceed “interpreting federal law or the law of another State.”
239
 
The government also stated in its amicus brief that the Harvey case is not 
a good candidate for resolving the questions presented.
240
 In discussing 
what claims Harvey’s tribal case may need to include, the government 
highlighted that no one argued against a state court “retaining jurisdiction 
over claims over which it would otherwise have jurisdiction under Williams 
v. Lee,” while calling “for a tribal court to decide specific questions within 
its expertise—in a manner analogous to principles of primary jurisdiction or 
certification of state-law issues to a state court.
241
 The government stated it 
was “aware of no basis in federal law for disapproving that procedure.”
242
 
After receiving the U.S. Solicitor General’s brief, the U.S. Supreme 
Court denied the petition for writ of certiorari.
243




The remainder of this Article weighs the history and law set forth above, 
and it establishes a new approach to interpreting and implementing the 
tribal remedies doctrine, with a focus on state courts.  
IV. Contrast with Administrative Exhaustion and Abstention 
Courts often analyze the extent to which the tribal remedies doctrine 
shares characteristics of other doctrines—specifically, exhaustion of 
administrative remedies and abstention under Colorado River or Younger. 
In each of these contexts, a court stays its hand or dismisses a case based on 
the existence (or non-existence) of proceedings in a different forum.  
Administrative exhaustion relates to the requirement that a claim run its 
course through an agency prior to forming the basis for a lawsuit. For 
example, if the U.S. Forest Service is negligent in carrying out controlled 
burns and damages a farmer’s land, and the farmer wants to file a Federal 
Tort Claims Act case, the farmer must first pursue the matter before the 
                                                                                                             
 238. Id. (citing Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Eng’g, 
P.C., 467 U.S. 138, 148 (1984)). 
 239. Id. 
 240. Id. at *20. 
 241. Id. at *21. 
 242. Id. 
 243. Harvey v. UTE Indian Tribe of the Uintah & Ouray Reservation, 139 S. Ct. 784 
(2019). 
 244. Id. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2020
272 AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44 
 
 
applicable federal agency. Two main purposes underpin administrative 
exhaustion. First, it protects “administrative agency authority” by 
discouraging “disregard of the agency’s procedures” and providing the 
agency “an opportunity to correct its own mistakes” before a court gets 
involved.
245
 And second, it supports efficiency and the economical 
resolution of claims involving agencies and may “produce a useful record 
for subsequent judicial consideration.”
246
 
Colorado River abstention is a rule where “federal courts may decline to 
exercise their jurisdiction, in otherwise ‘exceptional circumstances,’ where 
denying a federal forum would clearly serve an important countervailing 
interest, for example, where abstention is warranted by considerations of 
‘proper constitutional adjudication,’ ‘regard for federal-state relations,’ or 
‘wise judicial administration.’”
247
 And Younger abstention “exemplifies one 
class of cases in which federal-court abstention is required: When there is a 
parallel, pending state criminal proceeding, federal courts must refrain from 
enjoining the state prosecution.”
248
 “[P]articular state civil proceedings that 
are akin to criminal prosecutions” also implicate Younger, as do 
proceedings involving “a State’s interest in enforcing the orders and 
judgments of its courts.”
249
  
Some jurists find an apt comparison between the tribal remedies doctrine 
and administrative exhaustion.
250
 This tends to be a position held by those 
claiming the doctrine does not apply to state courts. Courts that conclude 
the tribal remedies doctrine is mandatory for state courts often distinguish it 
from administrative exhaustion,
251
 and some point out similarities with 
                                                                                                             
 245. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 89 (2006) (internal quotations marks and alterations 
omitted).  
 246. Id. (internal quotations marks and alterations omitted).  
 247. Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 716 (1996) (citations omitted). It 
usually applies when there is: “[1)] a pending state proceeding; 2) a federal case involving 
the same or functionally similar claims and parties; 3) no constitutional or federalism 
problems are presented; and, 4) abstention is ordered out of considerations of wise judicial 
administration.” Comm. on Fed. Courts of the N.Y. State Bar Ass’n, The Abstention 
Doctrine: The Consequences of Federal Court Deference to State Court Proceedings, 122 
F.R.D. 89, 98 (1988). 
 248. Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 72 (2013). 
 249. Id. at 72–73. 
 250. See Harvey v. Ute Indian Tribe of Uintah & Ouray Reservation, 2017 UT 75, ¶ 120, 
416 P.3d 401 (Lee, A.C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Astorga v. Wing, 118 
P.3d 1103, 1106–08 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005). 
 251. Harvey, 2017 UT 75, ¶ 104 (Himonas, J., concurring); Drumm v. Brown, 716 A.2d 
50, 60 (Conn. 1998). 
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 State court applicability aside, other jurists distinguish 
abstention from the doctrine.
253
  
Rather than fitting the tribal remedies doctrine into pre-existing 
categories like administrative exhaustion and abstention, it is best to view 
the doctrine as something independent, though it exhibits certain 
characteristics of established legal rules. Based on review of the discussions 
in cases on this subject, there are least three common issues built into these 
legal doctrines: (1) whether it is jurisdictional or prudential; (2) whether it 
can be waived; and (3) whether it involves balancing different factors.
254
  
A. Jurisdictional or Prudential 
The tribal remedies doctrine, Colorado River abstention, and Younger 
abstention are prudential rules rooted in comity, not the court’s 
jurisdiction.
255
 Administrative exhaustion, however, is sometimes 
prudential and at other times jurisdictional. For example, the statutorily 
mandated exhaustion of administrative remedies in the Freedom of 
Information Act is prudential;
256
 whereas the Federal Tort Claims Act’s 
requirement of exhaustion with the applicable agency is tied to the court’s 
                                                                                                             
 252. Drumm, 716 A.2d at 677 n.8; Harvey, 2017 UT 75, ¶ 135 (Lee, A.C.J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part). Dicta in Iowa Mutual makes the comparison to abstention. 
Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 16 n.8 (1987). Scholars picked up on this. 
Kirsten Matoy Carlson, Note, Towards Tribal Sovereignty and Judicial Efficiency: Ordering 
the Defenses of Tribal Sovereign Immunity and Exhaustion of Tribal Remedies, 101 MICH. 
L. REV. 569, 576 n.44 (2002); Watson, supra note 31, at 534–35; Timothy W. Joranko, 
Exhaustion of Tribal Remedies in the Lower Courts After National Farmers Union and Iowa 
Mutual: Toward a Consistent Treatment of Tribal Courts by the Federal Judicial System, 78 
MINN. L. REV. 259, 277 (1993). 
 253. Harvey, 2017 UT 75, ¶ 106 (Himonas, J., concurring). 
 254. In the context of an article encouraging federal courts to reassess their 
implementation of the tribal remedies doctrine, Professor Watson provides a thorough 
discussion of the doctrine alongside administrative exhaustion and abstention. Watson, supra 
note 31, at 588–609. 
 255. Iowa Mut., 480 U.S. at 15, 20 n.14 (tribal remedies doctrine); Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. 
v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 77 (2013) (Younger); Allian v. Allian, No. 18 C 3825, 2018 WL 
6591422, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 14, 2018) (Colorado River). 
 256. Jean-Pierre v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 880 F. Supp. 2d 95, 104 n.8 (D.D.C. 2012); 
Hull v. IRS, 656 F.3d 1174, 1181–82 (10th Cir. 2011) (collecting cases). The Supreme Court 
recently held that a specific aspect of the administrative exhaustion framework within Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is prudential and not jurisdictional. Fort Bend Cty. v. 
Davis, 139 S. Ct. 1843, 1846–47 (2019) (“We hold that Title VII’s charge-filing instruction 
is not jurisdictional, a term generally reserved to describe the classes of cases a court may 
entertain (subject-matter jurisdiction) . . . .”). 
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 With the former, failure to exhaust does not force the court 
to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction—but with the latter, it does. 
Courts generally employ abstention in “exceptional” circumstances
258
 
and describe it as “the exception, not the rule.”
259
 This is because the 
baseline against abstention is “the virtually unflagging obligation of the 
federal courts to exercise the jurisdiction given them.”
260
 Tribal exhaustion, 
however, is the default when the tribal court has a legitimate claim to 
jurisdiction, and the nontribal court retains jurisdiction only if the case 
meets an exception established by the Supreme Court.
261
  
The comity concerns of Colorado River and Younger relate to state 
courts. But the tribal remedies doctrine emphasizes comity toward tribal 
courts. Between federal and state courts on one hand, and between nontribal 
and tribal courts on the other, comity has significantly different meanings. 
In the context of a tribe’s unique sovereign status in the country’s history, 
comity is directed at supporting tribal self-government.
262
 Younger’s respect 
for state courts comes from an entirely distinct rationale—the “recognition 
of the fact that the entire country is made up of a Union of separate state 
governments, and a continuance of the belief that the National Government 
will fare best if the States and their institutions are left free to perform their 
separate functions in their separate ways.”
263
 The driver for comity in 
Colorado River is “considerations of wise judicial administration, giving 
regard to conservation of judicial resources and comprehensive disposition 
of litigation.”
264
 These are different flavors of cross-jurisdictional respect. 
Further, Colorado River and Younger come into play in cases where the 
court already has jurisdiction.
265
 Courts are divided about whether the same 
                                                                                                             
 257. Coleman v. United States, 912 F.3d 824, 834 (5th Cir. 2019). 
 258. Jacobs, 571 U.S. at 73 (“Circumstances fitting within the Younger doctrine, we have 
stressed, are ‘exceptional’ . . . .”). 
 259. Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 813 (1976) 
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 260. Id. at 817. 
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 262. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 14 (1987); see also El Paso Nat. Gas 
Co. v. Neztsosie, 526 U.S. 473, 484 (1999) (“Exhaustion was appropriate in [National 
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self-government.’”) (quoting National Farmers, 471 U.S. at 856). 
 263. Middlesex Cty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 431 (1982) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 264. Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 817 (internal alteration and quotation marks omitted). 
 265. Brooks v. N.H. Supreme Court, 80 F.3d 633, 638 (1st Cir. 1996) (describing 
Younger as “paradigm” where “a federal court must abstain from reaching the merits of a 
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is true for the tribal remedies doctrine; some find jurisdiction must come 
first,
266





The function of waiver is another difference between the legal rules. A 
party generally may not waive its ability to invoke the tribal remedies 
doctrine,
268
 and a court can invoke the doctrine sua sponte.
269
 For 
administrative exhaustion grounded in jurisdiction, waiver is not available, 
as a party may raise the issue at any point in a motion to dismiss for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction.
270
 But prudential administrative exhaustion is a 
defense that may be waived, and courts usually address the issue in the 
                                                                                                             
case over which it has jurisdiction”); Thomas-Wise v. Nat’l City Mortg. Co., No. 14 C 3460, 
2015 WL 641770, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 13, 2015) (“Colorado River abstention comes into 
play only after a federal court has otherwise assured itself of its subject matter 
jurisdiction.”). 
 266. Ninigret Dev. Corp. v. Narragansett Indian Wetuomuck Hous. Auth., 207 F.3d 21, 
28–29 (1st Cir. 2000) (“[A]s long as federal subject-matter jurisdiction exists, a defense 
predicated on tribal sovereign immunity is susceptible to direct adjudication in the federal 
courts, without reference to the tribal exhaustion doctrine.”) (citing cases from the Fifth and 
Seventh Circuits). 
 267. Garcia v. Akwesasne Hous. Auth., 268 F.3d 76, 79 (2d Cir. 2001) (“We consider 
tribal exhaustion first; sovereign immunity second.”); Davis v. Mille Lacs Band of 
Chippewa Indians, 193 F.3d 990, 992 (8th Cir. 1999); Romero v. Wounded Knee, LLC, No. 
CIV. 16-5024-JLV, 2018 WL 4279446, at *2 (D.S.D. Aug. 31, 2018) (“Tribal sovereign 
immunity goes to the court’s subject matter jurisdiction and usually the court must address 
jurisdictional issues first. But the precedent of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Eighth Circuit requires the court to enforce the exhaustion of tribal court remedies before 
fully analyzing tribal sovereign immunity.”). The Romero court found that, even in the face 
of Title VII claims subject to exclusive federal jurisdiction, the tribal court should still have 
the opportunity to assess a tribal sovereign immunity defense; if the defendant was immune, 
then it would not matter whether the tribal court could exercise authority over the Title VII 
claims. Romero, 2018 WL 4279446, at *2–4. 
 268. Smith v. Moffett, 947 F.2d 442, 445 (10th Cir. 1991). But see World Fuel Servs., 
Inc. v. Nambe Pueblo Dev. Corp., 362 F. Supp. 3d 1021, 1090 n.28 (D.N.M. Jan. 23, 2019) 
(discussing that waiver may be possible); see also Ninigret, 207 F.3d at 31 n.7 (“There is 
virtually no case law as to the effectiveness vel non of an express disclaimer of tribal court 
remedies.”). 
 269. United States v. Tsosie, 92 F.3d 1037, 1041 (10th Cir. 1996); Romero, 2018 WL 
4279446, at *2. 
 270. Coleman v. United States, 912 F.3d 824, 835 (5th Cir. 2019) (affirming district 
court’s “holding [that] exhaustion [is] a jurisdictional prerequisite for FTCA claims that 
cannot be waived.”) (citing McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 109–13 (1993)). 
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context of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.
271
 Both forms of 
abstention are waivable and may be raised sua sponte.
272
  
C. Balancing  
Turning to whether or not a court balances factors in applying each legal 
rule, the tribal remedies doctrine does not involve a balancing inquiry—
generally, if the tribal court has a colorable claim to jurisdiction, tribal court 
proceedings must occur.
273
 Similarly, administrative exhaustion 
incorporates no balancing judgments; administrative remedies were 
exhausted or they were not, and before moving forward the court either 
requires exhaustion (if jurisdictional) or considers whether the issue is 
properly before the court (if prudential). Abstention under Colorado River 
asks the court to weigh various factors in examining the need to stay its 
hand or dismiss the case.
274
 However, some courts find that “balancing the 
Younger elements, rather than determining whether each element, on its 
own, is satisfied, conflicts with the requirement that federal courts abstain 
only in those cases falling within the ‘carefully defined’ boundaries of 
federal abstention doctrines.”
275
 Whether an exception to the tribal remedies 
doctrine is met draws upon the court’s legal judgment in a more 
discretionary manner, but there still is not a multi-factorial balancing 




There is another distinction between the tribal remedies doctrine and 
administrative exhaustion worth noting. Some who find that the tribal 
                                                                                                             
 271. See Acosta v. FBI, 946 F. Supp. 2d 47, 49–52 (D.D.C. Apr. 17, 2013) (analyzing 
FOIA exhaustion under FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) and noting an agency’s “lapse waives any 
requirement Plaintiff had to exhaust his administrative appeals”).  
 272. Lamex Foods, Inc. v. Audeliz Lebrón Corp., 646 F.3d 100, 112 n.15 (1st Cir. 2011) 
(holding Colorado River may be waived and also the court can raise it sua sponte); Bice v. 
La. Pub. Def. Bd., 677 F.3d 712, 716 n.3 (5th Cir. 2012) (finding Younger may be waived); 
Hill v. Snyder, 878 F.3d 193, 206 (6th Cir. 2017) (noting court can raise Younger sua 
sponte). 
 273. See Harvey v. Ute Indian Tribe of Uintah & Ouray Reservation, 2017 UT 75, ¶ 107, 
416 P.3d 401 (Himonas, J., concurring). 
 274. Black Sea Inv., Ltd. v. United Heritage Corp., 204 F.3d 647, 650 (5th Cir. 2000) 
(balancing the Colorado River factors); see also Harvey, 2017 UT 75, ¶ 106 (Himonas, J., 
concurring) (describing Colorado River as “balanc[ing] multiple factors, including judicial 
economy concerns and the avoidance of piecemeal litigation”). 
 275. AmerisourceBergen Corp. v. Roden, 495 F.3d 1143, 1148 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting 
New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 359 (1989)). 
 276. Harvey, 2017 UT 75, ¶ 107 (Himonas, J., concurring). 
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remedies doctrine should not apply in state courts make a certain point 
about the hierarchical structure of an exhaustion requirement. The latest 
iteration of this argument is in Associate Chief Justice Lee’s opinion in 
Harvey.
277
 According to this view, exhaustion “is a principle that regulates 
the timing of proceedings in tribunals that operate in a hierarchical 
relationship.”
278
 Because federal courts and not state courts have the power 
to review tribal court rulings after the tribal remedies doctrine is enforced, 
National Farmers and Iowa Mutual are “not implicated” in state court.
279
 
This is due to the lack of a “hierarchical relationship between the two 
sovereign courts—and thus no right of direct review.”
280
  
This line of reasoning glosses over important differences between 
administrative agencies and tribal nations. As Justice Himonas explained in 
Harvey, the argument fails to appreciate that, “[u]nlike administrative 
agencies, or even states, tribes are not subordinates in our constitutional 
hierarchy.”
281
 Tribes “remain separate sovereigns pre-existing the 
Constitution,” subject to Congress’ “plenary control.”
282
 The timing of the 
existence of tribal nations illustrates a distinction between their authority 
and that of administrative agencies.
283
 A federal agency where claims must 
be exhausted came into existence after the creation of the federal 
government. And some agencies, like the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC), were created long after the establishment of the 
federal government.
284
 If the federal government went away, so would the 
federal agencies. Native nations on the other hand, were active long before 
the United States.
285
 Their existence, while under the control of Congress 
                                                                                                             
 277. Id. ¶ 121 (Lee, A.C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also Astorga v. 
Wing, 118 P.3d 1103, 1106–08 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005).  
 278. Id. (Lee, A.C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citation and quotation 
marks omitted). 
 279. Id. ¶ 123. 
 280. Id. (citing Astorga, 118 P.3d at 1107). 
 281. Id. ¶ 104 (Himonas, J., concurring). 
 282. Id. (Himonas, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Michigan 
v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 572 U.S. 782, 788–89 (2014)). 
 283. This distinction in ontology is key to keeping the two separate. See generally 
Thomas Hofweber, Logic and Ontology: 3.1. Different Conceptions of Ontology, STAN. 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (Oct. 11, 2017), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-ontology/ 
#Ont (exploring different ideas of ontology). 
 284. Congress created the EEOC as part of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (2018). 
 285. Cooter & Fikentscher, supra note 2, at 298–302. 
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within the framework of federal Indian law, is independent from the federal 
and state governments of the United States.  
Furthermore, the exertion of authority over people is different between 
agencies and tribes. Agencies have power over people as arms of the 
federal government, which exerts sovereign power over American citizens 
that they granted to the government.
286
 This applies equally to non-Indian 
and Indian people.
287
 The power of tribal judiciaries, functioning as 
branches of tribal governments, is not drawn from all Americans
288
 and 
affects non-Indian and Indian people differently. The jurisdictional reach of 
tribal courts is much more limited than federal agencies. Tribal courts have 
jurisdiction over non-Indian people in specifically designated instances 
only.
289
 And their criminal jurisdiction is even more circumscribed.
290
 At 
the same time, “tribes have historically been regarded as unconstrained by 




The bottom line is that federal administrative agencies and tribal 
governments are not amenable to analogy. Consequently, it is a weakness 
for an argument—based on that analogy—to claim that the tribal remedies 
doctrine does not apply to state courts. The comparison might be helpful for 
giving general context to the tribal remedies doctrine, but not for resolving 
complicated and substantive questions about it. 
This section spotlights the problems with attempts to cabin the tribal 
remedies doctrine within the exhaustion of administrative remedies or 
forms of abstention. While the tribal remedies doctrine, crafted by the 
Supreme Court, shares certain characteristics with other court-created and 
statutory legal rules, no twin doctrine has been identified yet—and likely 
                                                                                                             
 286. THE FEDERALIST NO. 22, at 146 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) 
(acknowledging the People as “that pure original fountain of all legitimate authority”); THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 49, at 339 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (“[T]he people are 
the only legitimate fountain of power . . . .”). 
 287. In 1924, Congress established that all Indian people are American citizens. 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1401 (2018).  
 288. United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975) (describing tribes as “‘a 
separate people’ possessing ‘the power of regulating their internal and social relations’”) 
(quoting United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 381–82 (1886)). 
 289. See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 557 (1981). 
 290. Ennis & Mayhew, supra note 17, at 429–32; see Greg S. Keogh, Note, Extending 
Tribal Criminal Jurisdiction Outside of Indian Country: Kelsey v. Pope, 43 AM. INDIAN L. 
REV. 223, 224–27 (2018–2019); Fortson, supra note 15, at 105–14. 
 291. United States v. Bryant, 136 S. Ct. 1954, 1962 (2016) (quoting Santa Clara Pueblo 
v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56 (1978)).  
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none exists. Considering how Native nations maintain a unique role in 
balance with the federal government and individual states, this conclusion 
is natural. As a result, determining whether the tribal remedies doctrine 
applies to state courts requires an analytical foundation separate from 
administrative exhaustion and abstention. The Court’s decision in Iowa 
Mutual accomplishes that. 
V. State Court Applicability 
The language of Iowa Mutual and the need to support tribal sovereignty 
compel state courts to apply the tribal remedies doctrine. It is true that the 
U.S. Supreme Court, the creator of the doctrine, has not addressed state 
court applicability. But in the context of applying federal Indian law, with 
its principles and history, the next analytical step after noting that the issue 
is unresolved is not to fashion a new interpretation of the balance of power 
between tribal, state, and federal governments. Instead, when the starting 
point in Indian law is silence, the Supreme Court provided guidance in 
Iowa Mutual: “Because the Tribe retains all inherent attributes of 
sovereignty that have not been divested by the Federal Government, the 
proper inference from silence . . . is that the sovereign power . . . remains 
intact.”
292
 With this foundation, it is difficult to envision a path forward for 




Based on a straightforward interpretation of Iowa Mutual, the tribal 
remedies doctrine applies to state courts. The Court began its tribal 
exhaustion analysis by firmly rooting the doctrine in the federal policy of 
supporting tribal self-government.
294
 To explain the reach of that policy, the 
                                                                                                             
 292. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 18 (1987) (quoting Merrion v. Jicarilla 
Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 149 n.14 (1982)) (citing Martinez, 436 U.S. at 60 (“[A] proper 
respect both for tribal sovereignty itself and for the plenary authority of Congress in this area 
cautions that we tread lightly in the absence of clear indications of legislative intent.”)) (“In 
the absence of any indication that Congress intended the diversity statute to limit the 
jurisdiction of the tribal courts, we decline petitioner’s invitation to hold that tribal 
sovereignty can be impaired in this fashion.”). 
 293. Justice Himonas makes a similar point in Harvey. In view of Congress’ express 
“preference for limiting state control over Indian affairs in statutes including the Indian 
Child Welfare Act . . . and the Major Crimes Act,” Justice Himonas stated “it would be 
anomalous to conclude that the tribal exhaustion rule only applies in federal court.” Harvey 
v. Ute Indian Tribe of Uintah & Ouray Reservation, 2017 UT 75, ¶¶ 96–97, 416 P.3d 401 
(Himonas, J., concurring). 
 294. Iowa Mut., 480 U.S. at 14; see also El Paso Nat. Gas Co. v. Neztsosie, 526 U.S. 
473, 484 (1999) (“Exhaustion was appropriate in [National Farmers and Iowa Mutual] 
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Court specifically pointed out that in some situations it overrides state 
authority.
295
 For instance, whether or not a particular federal law preempts 
state authority, the need to promote a tribe’s self-government may be a 
controlling consideration.
296
 In this sense, the federal policy has application 
even where Congress has not spoken. 
This language provides context to Iowa Mutual’s explanation of why the 
doctrine applies to federal question and diversity jurisdiction. The Court 
emphasized the danger that “unconditional access” to a federal forum 
would pose to tribal courts.
297
 Allowing litigants to avoid a tribal court 
system would create “direct competition with the tribal courts, thereby 
impairing the [tribal courts’] authority over reservation affairs.”
298
 While 
the issue before the Court in Iowa Mutual focused on whether a federal 
forum would compete with a tribal one, the danger highlighted in Iowa 
Mutual seamlessly applies when considering a state forum and a tribal 
court.
299
 Iowa Mutual confirms this itself. In cautioning against 
“unconditional access,” the Court held that “[a]djudication of such matters 
by any nontribal court also infringes upon tribal law—making authority, 
because tribal courts are best qualified to interpret and apply tribal law.”
300
  
                                                                                                             
because ‘Congress is committed to a policy of supporting tribal self-government . . . .’”) 
(quoting Nat’l Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 856 (1985)). 
 295. Iowa Mut., 480 U.S. at 14. 
 296. Id. 
 297. Id. at 16. 
 298. Id. 
 299. See Harvey v. Ute Indian Tribe of Uintah & Ouray Reservation, 2017 UT 75, ¶ 98, 
416 P.3d 401 (Himonas, J., concurring) (“[T]he tribal exhaustion rule admits of no 
distinction between federal and state courts.”); Drumm v. Brown, 716 A.2d 50, 63 (Conn. 
1998) (“In our view, direct competition from state courts is equally likely to disrupt that 
federal policy. Because we owe no less deference to federal, statutory based policy than do 
the federal courts, we should be no more willing than they to risk disruption of this federal 
policy by exercising jurisdiction over cases to which the doctrine would apply.”); Meyer & 
Assocs., Inc. v. Coushatta Tribe of La., 2007-2256, p. 12 (La. 9/23/08); 992 So.2d 446, 460 
(Kimball, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Supreme Court has held that unconditional access to the 
federal forum places it in direct competition with the tribal courts, thereby impairing the 
latter’s authority over reservation affairs. Certainly the same can be said of unconditional 
access to the state forum.”); Klammer v. Lower Sioux Convenience Store, 535 N.W.2d 379, 
381 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (“We must acknowledge that unconditional access to state court 
would similarly impair the tribal court’s authority.”).  
 300. Iowa Mut., 480 U.S. at 16. 
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Opponents of applying the tribal remedies doctrine to state courts 
dismiss Iowa Mutual’s use of the phrase, “any nontribal court,” as dicta.
301
 
But the phrase does not need to be a standalone holding to impact the 
application of tribal exhaustion. If it is not a holding, then it is at least an 
explanation of one—namely, that a permissive approach to competition 
with tribal courts breaches the federal policy to support tribal self-
government. Accordingly, adjudication of matters subject to tribal court 
jurisdiction in “any nontribal court” contravenes longstanding federal 
policy and Iowa Mutual’s central holding.
302
 The Solicitor General’s 
amicus brief in Harvey stated a position consistent with this, that the 
doctrine “applies as a matter of ‘federal policy’ when necessary to prevent 
‘direct competition with the tribal courts’ by ‘any nontribal court’—which 
would appear to include a state court—on matters of tribal ‘authority over 
reservation affairs.’”
303
 Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in Hicks provides 
additional support, expressly framing the doctrine as “determining the 
relationship between tribal courts and state and federal courts.”
304
 
Focusing on Justice Stevens’s dissent from Iowa Mutual’s exhaustion 
analysis further supports applying the tribal remedies doctrine to state 
courts. Justice Stevens argued for a narrow construction of whether 
litigation outside the tribal courts undermines tribal self-government.
305
 In 
Justice Stevens’ view, because “the pendency of an action in the state court 
is no bar to proceedings concerning the same matter in the Federal court 
having jurisdiction[,]” National Farmers applies only when there is a 
pending tribal suit raising a “question concerning the jurisdiction of the 
[tribal court.]”
306
 Justice Stevens thought that interpretation struck the right 
balance between the sovereignty of tribes and states.
307
 But the opinion of 
the Court embraced a starkly different reading of National Farmers and a 
more expansive view of the tribal remedies doctrine. It is logical to infer 
that the Court refused to restrict the doctrine because National Farmers did 
not set forth such a limited rule and the federal policy promoting self-
                                                                                                             
 301. Harvey, 2017 UT 75, ¶¶ 120–121 (Lee, A.C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
 302. Iowa Mut., 480 U.S. at 16. 
 303. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Harvey v. UTE Indian Tribe of the 
Uintah & Ouray Reservation, 139 S. Ct. 784 (2019) (No. 17-1301), 2018 WL 6382963, at 
*12 (quoting Iowa Mut., 480 U.S. at 16). 
 304. Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 398 (2001) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment). 
 305. Iowa Mut., 480 U.S. at 21 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 306. Id. at 20–22 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 307. Id. at 22 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2020
282 AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44 
 
 
government does not accord with Justice Stevens’s view. Rather, whether 
or not jurisdiction is based on § 1331 or § 1332, and whether or not the 
tribal suit directly challenges the tribe’s jurisdiction, the holdings of 
National Farmers and Iowa Mutual show that a hands-off approach to 
litigants avoiding tribal jurisdiction contradicts tribal sovereignty and 
federal policy. It follows that litigants may not have unconditional access to 
state courts when the tribe has jurisdiction, and the tribal remedies doctrine 
applies to state courts. 
A uniform approach to applying the tribal remedies doctrine across the 
states is vital to tribal sovereignty. Beyond the eighteen states that 
addressed the doctrine, many states with tribes have yet to resolve the 
question of whether National Farmers and Iowa Mutual contain holdings 
they must follow.
308
 Even before more states make their determinations, the 
current array of outcomes throughout the country creates a problematic 
situation where the sovereignty of Native nations means something 
different depending on location. In addition to being fundamentally unfair 
to Native people, allowing the arbitrariness of geography to dictate 
sovereignty is contrary to the federal government’s trust responsibility and 
policy of supporting tribal self-government.  
VI. Requiring a Pending Tribal Case 
In contrast to the question of state court application, it is less clear 
whether state courts should be required to yield to tribal jurisdiction in the 
absence of a pending tribal case. The two leading state decisions applying 
the doctrine resolve this question differently. In Harvey, the Utah Supreme 
Court refused to impose this requirement,
309
 but in Drumm, the Connecticut 
Supreme Court ruled that a pending action in tribal court is a prerequisite.
310
 
Federal courts generally do not mandate a pending tribal action before 
invoking the tribal remedies doctrine.
311
 At least three of the states that have 
not adopted the tribal remedies doctrine focused on this issue and expressed 
                                                                                                             
 308. See Appendices I and II. 
 309. Harvey v. Ute Indian Tribe of Uintah & Ouray Reservation, 2017 UT 75, ¶¶ 42–43, 
416 P.3d 401. 
 310. Drumm v. Brown, 716 A.2d 50, 64–66 (Conn. 1998). 
 311. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Harvey v. UTE Indian Tribe of the 
Uintah & Ouray Reservation, 139 S. Ct. 784 (2019) (No. 17-1301), 2018 WL 6382963, at 
*18–19 (collecting cases from the First, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits); see also Heldt v. Payday 
Fin., LLC, 12 F. Supp. 3d 1170, 1180 (D.S.D. 2014).  
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the view that a tribal court case is an essential ingredient.
312
 Based on the 
interpretation of Iowa Mutual above, and an appreciation of the doctrine as 
distinct from administrative exhaustion and abstention, a pending tribal case 
is not necessary for applying the doctrine.  
Harvey did not provide a thorough analysis of this question—it cited 
federal cases echoing its determination that the “doctrine does not require a 
case to be pending in the tribal court.”
313
 Federal courts largely take the 
view that the comity concerns expressed in National Farmers and Iowa 
Mutual do not depend on a concurrent tribal case.
314
  
The Connecticut Supreme Court came to its conclusion in Drumm after a 
close reading of National Farmers, Iowa Mutual, and Strate. The Drumm 
court concluded each case “use[d] narrow language . . . indicating the 
presupposition of pending proceedings.”
315
 Drumm then grounded its 
holding in “three complementary policy considerations.”
316
 The court found 
that “the impact on a tribal court’s authority of a nontribal court’s 
adjudication of a matter over which the tribal court could, but has not, 
exercised jurisdiction is much more attenuated. Any such effect is 
speculative and indirect, consisting merely of a lost opportunity or a 
potential unrealized.”
317
 Second, relying on Connecticut law, Drumm 
pointed out that a court with jurisdiction has a “duty to adjudicate the case 
before it[,]” except “in an extreme, compelling situation.”
318
 And third, 
citing state law, Drumm gave weight to the “consideration of the traditional 
right of a plaintiff to select his forum.”
319
  
Drumm is correct that the Supreme Court’s language in National 
Farmers and Iowa Mutual framed this issue narrowly, suggesting that the 
Court presupposed a pending tribal case when applying the tribal remedies 
                                                                                                             
 312. Coeur d’Alene Tribe v. Johnson, 405 P.3d 13, 18–19 (Idaho 2017); Harrison v. 
Boyd Mississippi, Inc., 700 So.2d 247, 251 n.3 (Miss. 1997); Seneca v. Seneca, 741 
N.Y.S.2d 375, 379 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002). 
 313. Harvey, 2017 UT 75, ¶ 42. 
 314. Smith v. Moffett, 947 F.2d 442, 444 (10th Cir. 1991) (“The fact that Smith 
apparently has not yet presented his case to a tribal court does not diminish the comity 
considerations present in this case. Lower courts have held comity to be a concern even 
when a case filed in federal court has not yet been filed in tribal court.”) (citing cases from 
the Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits). 
 315. Drumm, 716 A.2d at 65. 
 316. Id. 
 317. Id. 
 318. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Ahneman v. Ahneman, 706 A.2d 
960 (Conn. 1998)). 
 319. Id. at 66 (citing Picketts v. Int’l Playtex, Inc., 576 A.2d 518 (Conn. 1990)). 
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 The Harvey dissent made a parallel point, claiming the Supreme 
Court’s cases turned on “the need to allow the ‘forum whose jurisdiction is 
being challenged’” to address its own jurisdiction.
321
 However, the Court 
used broad language in emphasizing the need to protect tribal sovereignty 
from external jurisdiction, which is the core of the doctrine.
322
 Iowa Mutual 
was clear that “unconditional access” to outside dispute resolution posed a 
direct threat to tribal authority.
323
 Access exists whether or not a tribal case 
is pending.  
Consequently, Drumm is not entirely correct that the “impact on a tribal 
court’s authority . . . is much more attenuated”
324
 because Iowa Mutual 
broadly articulated its determination that “unconditional access” to 
nontribal courts will undermine tribes.
325
 Similarly, the Harvey dissent 
takes a view toward the doctrine that is too restricting.
326
 Iowa Mutual’s 
majority foreclosed such a position in its rejection of Justice Stevens’ 
confining interpretation of whether nontribal litigation undercuts tribal self-
government. When, on one hand, there is narrow language the Supreme 
Court used in prior cases, and, on the other hand, the comity concerns at the 
heart of the doctrine are still applicable, resolving the tension in favor of 
comity accords with the doctrine’s spirit. As federal courts have found, 
“[t]he fact that [a party] has not yet presented his case to a tribal court does 
not diminish the comity considerations present” in federal court.
327
  
The second policy rationale identified in Drumm is not on point when it 
comes to the tribal remedies doctrine.
328
 When a court analyzes the 
                                                                                                             
 320. Id. at 65. 
 321. Harvey v. Ute Indian Tribe of Uintah & Ouray Reservation, 2017 UT 75, ¶ 138, 416 
P.3d 401 (Lee, A.C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Nat’l Farmers 
Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 856 (1985)). 
 322. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 16 (1987); Harvey, 2017 UT 75, ¶ 98 
(Himonas, J., concurring). 
 323. 480 U.S. at 16. 
 324. Drumm, 716 A.2d at 65. 
 325. Iowa Mut., 480 U.S. at 16.  
 326. Harvey, 2017 UT 75, ¶¶ 138–140 (Lee, A.C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) (citing National Farmers, 471 U.S. at 856).  
 327. Smith v. Moffett, 947 F.2d 442, 444 (10th Cir. 1991). 
 328. Justice Himonas’s concurrence in Harvey provides a thoughtful response to the third 
policy rationale identified in Drumm—deferring to the plaintiff’s choice of forum. 
Answering the Harvey dissent’s claim that tribal exhaustion “overrid[es]” the right to “self-
governance” by disregarding an Indian litigant’s forum choice, Justice Himonas explained, 
“The ‘self-governance’ that the tribal exhaustion doctrine seeks to promote is the self-
governance that comes from encouraging the development of tribal judicial institutions; it is 
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doctrine, the starting point is assessing whether there is tribal jurisdiction 
over the case; it is not the nontribal court’s “unflagging obligation” to 
resolve the case, which is how abstention rules function.
329
 Similarly, the 
tribal remedies doctrine does not control when the case fits within an 
exception the Supreme Court created, but in the abstention context, the 
nontribal court’s decision to abstain is the exception. As discussed earlier, 
the history and unique role of tribes in relation to state and federal 
governments set the tribal remedies doctrine apart from other traditional 
rules of court jurisdiction.
330
 With a majority of the policy reasons 
presented in Drumm and echoed in the Harvey dissent falling short of 
showing the necessity of a pending case in tribal court, and because 
imposing such a rule contravenes Iowa Mutual, the absence of a tribal case 
is not an obstacle to applying the doctrine. 
Arguing in favor of requiring a pending tribal case, the Solicitor 
General’s amicus brief in Harvey asserted that, absent a tribal suit, there is 
no conflict with tribal courts because Williams v. Lee curbs any problematic 
competition.
331
 The government accurately points out that state courts are 
capable of hearing a variety of tribe-related disputes: issues of reservation 
access that arise out of Indian Country; claims a tribal member brings 
against a non-Indian person, even those arising in Indian Country; and cases 
touching on a tribe’s interests and involving interpretations of tribal law.
332
 
While the tribal remedies doctrine prioritizes the protection of tribal 
authority, it is important not to lose sight of the tribe-related matters that 
state courts can handle and the safeguard established in Williams v. Lee.  
The government’s line of reasoning offers a solid argument for allowing 
states to demand a tribal case before applying the doctrine. However, if a 
state court adopts that view, it should also consider another aspect of the 
government’s argument. As somewhat of a hybrid position, the Solicitor 
General proposed allowing the state court to hold on to claims properly 
before it and peel off specific claims or questions for the tribal court to 
address—”in a manner analogous to the principles of primary jurisdiction 
                                                                                                             
not the policy of allowing litigants to choose their own forum.” Harvey, 2017 UT 75, ¶ 108 
n.3 (Himonas, J., concurring). 
 329. Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976). 
 330. See supra Part IV. 
 331. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Harvey v. Ute Indian Tribe of the 
Uintah & Ouray Reservation, 139 S. Ct. 784 (2019) (No. 17-1301), 2018 WL 6382963, at 
*12–13 (citation omitted). 
 332. Id. at *13. 
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or certification of state-law issues to a state court.”
333
 This view respects 
both the essence of the tribal remedies doctrine and the legitimate role state 





Whether it is federal, state, or tribal, a court or dispute resolution system 
is indispensable to a sovereign’s rule of law and cultural preservation. 
Because the current legal landscape in the United States permits individual 
state courts to decide whether to apply the tribal remedies doctrine, the 
authority of tribal courts varies throughout the country. Considering the 
importance of courts in Native nations, that result is not acceptable. 
Supreme Court precedent, specifically Iowa Mutual, requires state courts to 
apply the tribal remedies doctrine. Separating the doctrine from the legal 
rules of administrative exhaustion and abstention confirms this conclusion 
and reveals that a pending tribal court action is not required before applying 
the tribal remedies doctrine in state courts.  
                                                                                                             
 333. Id. at *21. 
 334. A follow-up issue is whether the tribal remedies doctrine itself mandates this 
piecemeal approach, or whether states are free to implement it if they choose. Because the 
Supreme Court’s cases on the doctrine do not get close to this narrow issue, it may be best 
left to the states. 
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 335. The states shown in gray have not addressed the tribal remedies doctrine. 
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Distinguishing between states and territories with: (1) federally 
recognized tribes only; (2) state-recognized tribes only; (3) both federally 
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 336. List of Federally Recognized Tribes by State, MASS. CTR. FOR NATIVE AM. 
AWARENESS, http://www.mcnaa.org/uploads/1/2/6/5/12656184/federally_recognized_tribes_ 
by_state.pdf (last visited Aug. 2, 2019). 
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